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TO TELL THE TRUTH: PHYSICIANS' DUTY




Developments in tort theory and practice, including the es-
tablishment of national standards for specialists, the creation of
common knowledge exceptions, and the use of res ipsa loquitur,
have done much to overcome the "wall of silence" that once made
medical malpractice actions such high-risk, low-gain efforts.'
Plaintiffs may now avoid nonsuits by using medical experts drawn
from outside the locality, 2 dispense with expert testimony alto-
gether in certain cases, 3 and shift the burden of proof to the de-
fendant once certain evidence is shown.4 At the same time, the
patient-consumer movement has helped to dispel feelings of de-
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1. For discussions of the "wall of silence" problem, see Kelner, The Silent Doc-
tors-The Conspiracy of Silence, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 119 (1970); Spence, The Adverse
Witness Rule." A Cure/or a Conspiracy, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1968); Note, Over-
coming the "Conspiracy of Silence" Statutory and Common-Law Innovations, 45
MINN. L. REV. 1019 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Note, Statutory and Common Law
Innovations]. For a candid view of the problem from a physician's standpoint, see W.
NOLEN, A SURGEON'S WORLD 148-65 (1972).
2. See J. KING, JR., THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 72-78 (1977); 1 D.
LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 8.06 (1977 & Supp. 1979).
3. See notes 76-77 infra.
4. See note 74 infra.
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pendency and helplessness5 that patients once experienced in their
dealings with the medical establishment. 6 Patients today seek ac-
cess to their medical records, demand second opinions before con-
senting to surgery, and, in general, scrutinize their course of
treatment more carefully than they did in the past.
7
Patients are also, increasingly, turning to the courts for re-
dress when they believe that they have suffered from negligent
treatment at the hands of professionals.8 Although it has been
suggested that national health insurance or a national health serv-
ice might help to diminish the resulting "malpractice crisis,"9
these proposals have met with strong resistance.' 0 It seems likely,
5. Illness tends to make patients vulnerable, dependent, and insecure. See I.
JANIS, PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS: PSYCHOANALYTIC AND BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF
SURGICAL PATIENTS (1958); J. KATZ & A. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO
DECIDES WHAT? 84-86 (1975); E. KRAUSE, POWER AND ILLNESS: THE POLITICAL
SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE 90 (1977); Peck, Emotional Responses to
Having Cancer, 114 AM. J. ROENTOLOGY, RADIUM THERAPY & NUCLEAR MED. 591,
593-96 (1972).
6. See E. KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 16.
7. Id See also G. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF HOSPITAL PATIENTS (1975). Unfor-
tunately, the patient-consumer movement appears to be confined to the middle and
upper classes.
8. See I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 1.01 (Supp. 1979); 2 id
20.07; Zimmerly & Smiley, Legislators React to the Malpractice Problems, 3 J. LEGAL
MED. 30 (1975).
9. See H.R. 2969, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H 1357 (daily ed. Mar.
14, 1979) ("Dellums Bill," providing for a national health service designed to bring
comprehensive health services, without charge, to all residents); S. 1720, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S12048 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1979) ("Kennedy Bill," providing
for a comprehensive system of national health insurance); H.R. 5400, 96th Cong., I st
Sess., 125 CONG. REC. H8506 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1979); S. 1812, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.,
125 CONG. REC. S 13382 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1979) ("Carter Bill," providing for limited
health insurance and proclaiming freedom of choice in selection of health care pro-
viders for all Americans). See generally Weiner, Governmental Regulation of Health
Care.- A Response to Some Criticisms Voiced by Proponents ofa "'Free Market", 4 AM.
J. L. & MED. 15 (1978). These measures would, of course, soften the impact of mal-
practice only to the extent that they would provide or pay for additional medical care
necessitated by the mishap. Although these bills do not appear to have been drafted
with a view to reducing the incidence of malpractice, their enactment might have such
an effect.
The Dellums bill, for example, would provide for lay participation in shaping
health policy. The vigilance that the public might bring to decisions respecting medi-
cal care could result in a lowering of the incidence of malpractice. Nationalization of
the medical profession could achieve the same effect, as physicians would be subject,
presumably, to supervision by government inspectors who were not themselves doc-
tors. Elimination of the "fee for service" concept, which is a feature of any thorough-
going reform proposal, might reduce the incidence of unnecessary treatment, such as
needless surgery. Discussion of these matters is beyond the scope of this Article, how-
ever.
10. Perhaps disagreement about what ought to be done to solve the medical mal-
practice crisis arises from disagreement about what the medical malpractice crisis is.
Some believe the "crisis" consists of unprevented, uncorrected, or uncompensated
malpractice, while others attribute its existence to rising medical fees, rising insurance
1980l
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therefore, that private malpractice actions will continue to occupy
the courts for some time. I"
This Article addresses a still unresolved aspect of the "wall of
silence" problem: the plight of the victim who is unaware that he
or she has suffered malpractice even though members of the treat-
ment team saw it occur.
Recent news accounts reveal truly astonishing tales of medi-
cal misconduct that went unreported and unremedied for long pe-
riods of time. ' 2 In one case, an anesthesiologist injected his urine
into a patient during a hysterectomy.1 3 The physician's bizarre
behavior was reported to the Board of Medical Quality Assur-
ance.14 The physician had been brought before the Board on ap-
proximately ten other occasions.' 5 Even so, the anesthesiologist
was not immediately relieved of duty. He injected urine into at
least one, and possibly two, other patients.16 Although the doctor
ultimately lost his license, no one thought to tell the victims, at
least one of whom allegedly suffered physical complications from
the injection. 17 This patient only learned about the incident a
year-and-a-half later when she read about the physician in the
newspaper. When she inquired at the hospital to find out whether
she had been one of the victims, the staff at first would not tell her.
On discovering that the physician had indeed injected his urine
into her veins she suffered a serious mental breakdown.' 8
In another case, the parents of a three-and-a-half-year-old
boy took him to a major medical center for treatment of a respira-
tory problem. 19 The child was placed in the adult intensive care
rates, and soaring awards and settlements. This Article is concerned primarily with
undetected and uncompensated malpractice, but will also consider the impact that
measures to aid detection and prevention are likely to have on medical fees and insur-
ance rates. See note 202 & accompanying text infra.
11. See 1 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 8.01, at 189.
12. See, e.g., L.A. Times, June 1, 1980, Pt. VIII, at 1, col. 3 (describing doctor
who has been sued numerous times for malpractice).
13. Boykins v. Community Hosp., No. SD-423111 (San Diego, Cal., Super. Ct.,
filed Sept. 26, 1978). Information concerning this case was obtained in a telephone
interview with Steven Archer, attorney at law, Belli & Choulos, in Los Angeles, Cal.
(Nov. 12, 1979).
14. Id The California Board of Medical Quality Assurance has a duty to inves-
tigate charges of misconduct among physicians and to administer discipline where
appropriate. The Board was created in 1975 by the Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2100 (West Supp. 1980).
15. Interview with Steven Archer, attorney at law, Belli & Choulos, in Los Ange-
les, Cal. (Nov. 12, 1979).
16. Id.
17. The patient allegedly developed infections, respiratory problems, and other
post-surgical complication as a result of the injection. ld.
18. Id She is presently suing all concerned. Boykins v. Community Hosp., No.
SD-423 111 (San Diego, Cal., Super. Ct., filed Sept. 26, 1978).
19. See L.A. Times, Dec. 13, 1979, Pt. X, at 15, col. 1.
[Vol. 28:52
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unit where he was given ten times the normal dosage of a muscle
relaxant designed to facilitate breathing. Later, the respirator tube
slipped out of the passage leading to the boy's lungs. For several
minutes, oxygen was pumped into his stomach rather than into his
lungs. He suffered cardiac arrest. The physicians revived the boy,
but when he opened his eyes, according to his mother, "there was
nothing there;" he had suffered permanent brain damage. It was
not until weeks later that the parents accidentally overheard one
doctor telling another about the overdose. The physician ex-
plained that he had decided not to tell the parents because they
"had enough on [their] minds already." 2 Unfortunately, this was
not an isolated case.
21
Self-policing by the medical profession is generally ineffec-
tual.22 Strong professional pressures keep physicians from report-
ing malpractice either to hospitals and state licensing boards or to
victims. 23 Physicians usually prefer to register disapproval by
boycotting an incompetent colleague or denying him or her the
use of hospital facilities.24 Incompetent or unstable physicians
may be able to continue their juggernaut paths for months or
years, however, before these unofficial sanctions make themselves
felt.25 Even then, the physician may simply transfer his or her
20. Id
21. See Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 226, 153 P.2d 325 (1944)
(physicians employed by defendant concealed extent of injury for over two years);
Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (1971) (defendant osteopaths and
radiologist concealed alleged negligence from plaintiff), modified, 62 N.J. 267, 300
A.2d 563 (1973); Hagman, The Medical Patient's Right to Know. Report on a Medical-
Legal-Ethical-Empirical Study, 17 UCLA L. REV. 758, 767, 768, 803 (1970). See also
L.A. Times, Mar. 15, 1980, Pt. II, at 1, col. 1; id., Mar. 16, 1980, Pt. I, at 26, col. 3
(Alleged that staff at Nevada hospital placed bets on time that various patients would
die. "Angel of death" nurse alleged to have hastened death of several patients, in
order to win bets, by disconnecting their oxygen supply. The betting pool was alleged
to have existed for some time before an anonymous informant reported it to the au-
thorities. The accused nurse was acquitted of all charges; the significance of this inci-
dent is that those who suspected foul play did not report it. See L.A. Times, May 31,
1980, Pt. I, at 12, col. 1.).
22. See notes 38-51 & accompanying text infra.
23. See Kelner, supra note 1, at 125. Professor Kelner's article presents a vivid
picture of the harassment suffered by a doctor who testified for the plaintiff in a mal-
practice case. The doctor was "awakened repeatedly by startling phone calls in the
night from. . . doctors. . . .They demanded to know why he was testifying against
a doctor, what was in it for him, and how could he do such a thing? They threatened
to bring the matter up at his medical society. . . . His hospital superior quizzed him
on how he became 'involved' in the case." See also W. NOLEN, supra note 1, at 156,
158, 163, 166-68.
24. See notes 43-44 & accompanying text infra.
25. See note 45 & accompanying text infra. Nolen describes a surgeon who was
"a real menace .... He ...was drinking a lot . . . . His hands shook and men-
tally he was in a fog." But "[n]either the chief of surgery nor any other staff surgeon
had the courage [to remove him]." W. NOLEN, supra note 1, at 163-64. "[D]octors
just cannot be relied upon to police themselves," because of fear of hurting one an-
1980]
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* practice to another city or to a rural area desperate for a physi-
cian.
26
It seems likely that the prospect of quicker, surer judicial re-
lief for victims would help to prevent at least some malpractice.
27
The specter of stiff recoveries and increased insurance premiums
may persuade some professionals to upgrade their skills, retire, or
switch to areas of practice in which they are more competent. It
may cause hospitals to hire physicians and grant hospital privi-
leges more selectively than they do at present. 28 Moreover, in the
absence of national health insurance or some other governmen-
tally funded health care delivery system, only judicial relief can
fully protect victims from the calamitous medical expenses, loss of
function, loss of income, and pain that undisclosed malpractice
can cause. 29
Before relief can be made available, the victim or the victim's
survivors must become aware that they are entitled to legal re-
dress. Unfortunately, many do not. The following analysis con-
siders this problem in the form of two paradigms:30
other's feelings, losing referrals, "being overcritical." id at 165. "One physician,
who had an M.D. from a diploma mill. . . , was apparently responsible for multiple
deaths," and "had done some strange things .... Though numerous complaints
had been lodged against him by nurses and aids ... [he] held his post for almost six
years on a continually renewed 'temporary' permit." Id. at 168. But see L.A. Times,
Dec. 25, 1980, Pt. I, at 34, col. I (jury ruled against a neurosurgeon "who sued for $3
million, contending that his medical career was ruined because 13 anesthesiologists
decided he was incompetent and refused to work with him").
26. See note 45 & accompanying text infra.
27. Causes of action in tort are created, in part, to deter immoral or pernicious
behavior. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 23 (4th ed.
1971).
28. Since hospitals have been held liable for hiring or extending visiting privi-
leges to incompetent physicians, see, e.g., Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500
P.2d 335 (1972); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326,
211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966), they might fear the addi-
tional liability which would result if a duty to disclose encouraged increased reporting
of incompetence.
29. For a discussion of the inadequacy of patients' private insurance, see note 117
30. There is no way of knowing how often these paradigms arise; this problem
does not lend itself to precise frequency counts. A review of the available literature
and interviews with medical experts in varying fields of practice indicate that the
paradigm cases occur all too frequently, however. The occasional widely reported
cases comprise only that small portion which comes to light because of luck, unusual
skepticism and perseverance on the part of a victim or family member, or the courage
of a rare maverick within the medical establishment.
A review of the cases where malpractice was initially concealed but was discov-
ered by the patient or the patient's survivors after the applicable statute of limitations
had run also gives some indication of the scope of the undisclosed malpractice prob-
lem. Although physicians have attempted to raise statute of limitations defenses in
such cases, many courts have rejected these defenses on grounds of "fraudulent con-
cealment." These courts allowed the victims to bring malpractice actions even though
MEDICAL MISTAKES
Paradigm #1: In the first paradigm, an unconscious patient
is the victim of clear medical malpractice committed by one mem-
ber of the treatment team, acting alone. A head surgeon, for ex-
ample, negligently damages an organ, or leaves a piece of medical
equipment inside the patient. After the operation, the patient feels
pain or loss of function, but the doctor explains that this is a com-
mon outcome of the surgery.
Paradigm #2: In the second case, the patient dies as a result
of the malpractice. The surviving spouse or relative is told, "We
are sorry, but these things happen. We did our best."
The two paradigms share a number of elements. First, clear
malpractice occurred. Second, at least one member of the treat-
ment team observed the malpractice. Third, no one told the pa-
tient or the surviving relatives what happened. Finally, the
patient was unconscious when the malpractice took place.
In both paradigms, the victims or their surviving relatives un-
questionably have a primary cause of action against the treating
physician for malpractice and perhaps for misrepresentation. 3'
These remedies are very often unavailing, however, because the
victims never realize they have been wrongfully injured-they be-
lieve that they have simply had bad luck. The thesis of this Arti-
cle is that this deficiency can be remedied by judicially imposing
an obligation on both the primary physician and on the observing
members of the treatment team 32 to report the malpractice to the
victim.
This Article begins by discussing the need for a duty to dis-
close, first showing that the medical profession does not regulate
itself effectively, 33 and then illustrating the importance of a duty
of disclosure in light of the inherent inequality present in the doc-
tor-patient relationship.3 4 It then considers recent developments
in tort theory which suggest that a duty to disclose malpractice
would constitute a small, but logical next step in the continuing
development of tort doctrine.35 Next, it outlines the prima facie
case for, and defenses to, an action for breach of the proposed
the statutes had run. Such cases are legion. See I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS,
supra note 2, 13.11 nn.67-70.
31. See Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (1971) (holding that
patient had cause of action for misrepresentation as a result of physician's statement
that severe burns were normal result of radiation treatment), modofied, 62 N.J. 267,
300 A.2d 563 (1973).
32. For a discussion of the need to extend the duty to observing treatment team
members who have not committed malpractice, see text accompanying notes 102-25
infra.
33. See text accompanying notes 38-54 infra.
34. See text accompanying notes 55-61 infra.
35. See text accompanying notes 68-141 infra.
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duty to disclose. 36 Finally, the Article considers objections that
might be made to a duty of disclosure, and offers answers to those
objections.
37
I. THE NEED FOR A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
A duty to disclose malpractice to the patient is needed for
several reasons. First, the medical profession's self-policing is in-
adequate and rarely, if ever, provides relief to the victims of mal-
practice. Second, the doctor-patient relationship is inherently
unequal because doctors and other medical personnel have
greater knowledge concerning the patient's illness and its treat-
ment than do most patients. Third, additional physical harm may
occur if malpractice is not discovered promptly and its effects rem-
edied. Fourth, delay in discovering malpractice decreases the
likelihood that a malpractice suit will be successful. Finally, with-
out a duty of disclosure, many malpractice victims will remain
uncompensated.
A. Self-Regulation." Professional Pressures to Prevent Disclosure
Most commentators agree that the medical profession does
not regulate itself effectively. 38 Licensing boards, 39 medical socie-
36. See text accompanying notes 142-54 infra for a discussion of the prima facie
case; text accompanying notes 155-65 infra for a discussion of possible defenses to the
prima facie case.
37. See text accompanying notes 166-209 infra.
38. See, e.g., E. FREIDSON, THE PROFESSION OF MEDICINE 137-57 (1970); E.
KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 279-85. See also W. NOLEN, supra note 1, at 148-68 (mal-
practice rarely checked); id at 289-93 (unnecessary surgery-referred to as "acute
remunerative appendectomies"-tolerated). Cf 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS,
supra note 2, 2.04 (describing various regulatory mechanisms at work within the
profession, with differing degrees of effectiveness).
According to the ethical principles of the medical profession, a physician must
report any accident, injury, or bad result stemming from his or her treatment. See
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 4 (1957)
("[Physicians] should expose, without hesitation, illegal or unethical conduct of fellow
members of the profession."), quoted in I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2,
$ 2.04, at 19 n.8. See also sources discussed in Hagman, supra note 21, at 804 n.174.
A new code of medical ethics adopted in 1980 by the AMA, telephone interview with
Denise Thiercof, Los Angeles County Medical Association Ethics Dep't, in Los Ange-
les, (Nov. 17, 1980) does not weaken this requirement. See AMERICAN MEDICAL As-
SOCIATION, DRAFT: PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1979) (rule II: "A physician
shall uphold the honor of the profession by dealing honestly with patients and col-
leagues, and striving to expose those physicians deficient in character, competence, or
who engage in deception."), discussed in Veatch, Professional Ethics.- New Principles
for Physicians, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1980, at 16, 17; TIME, Aug. 4, 1980, at
53, col. 1. Most doctors interpret these requirements as compelling them to report the
mishap to their superiors or to the hospital's pathology committee, rather than to the
patient. Telephone interview with Andrew Dolan, Associate Professor of Health
Services, University of Washington (Jan. 11, 1980); 1952 CONG. Q. EDITORIAL REP.:
SUPPRESSION OF MEDICAL ABUSES 775.
39. Although licensing boards are technically agencies of the state, they tend to
[Vol. 28:52
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ties, and hospital review committees responsible for most of the
regulation 40 generally focus their efforts on training and licensing
procedures. Unfortunately, this emphasis on training and certifi-
cation serves more to regulate the numbers and quality of entering
physicians than to provide a check on the competence of those
already in practice. 41 Doctors are rarely disciplined formally by
their peers even when their malpractice is blatant and continu-
ous. 42  Professional sanctions, when imposed, usually take the
form of refusals to enter into referral or collaborative relationships
with the offending doctor 43 or, occasionally, denials of access to
hospital facilities." These sanctions do not control the doctor's
behavior; they merely push him or her "outside the boundaries of
observability and influence. ' '45 Moreover, they provide no relief
be dominated by doctors. See E. FREIDSON, supra note 38, at 25-33; E. KRAUSE,
supra note 5, at 203, 279-85.
40. E. FREIDSON, supra note 38, at 138-39; 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra
note 2, 2.04.
41. See 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 6.02 ("[The profession's
advice to its members on minimization of legal liability often seems to proceed from
the premise that the primary objective should be . . . to . . . forestall lawsuits, and
the secondary objective [should be] . . . to reduce bad medical practice."); E.
RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND AMERICAN MEDICINE 5-6, 100 (1967) (AMA
limits number of physicians, thereby reducing competition and keeping fees high).
Moreover, at least one commentator has questioned the training and licensing
procedures used by some boards. See W. NOLEN, supra note 1, at 167-68 (licensing
board lowered standards to pass a doctor "with influential friends").
42. Only 770 disciplinary actions were brought against physicians nationwide in
1978. Only 126 physicians were disciplined in California in that year. L.A. Times,
Nov. 27, 1979, Pt. II, at 1, col. 4. See also E. KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 284; 1 D.
LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 2.03; Phillips & Noie, Idenqfying Unfit-
Physicians-The Hospital's Responsibility, HosP. MED. STAFF, Apr. 1976, at 1.
See a/so 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 2.04 (many state statutes
fail to provide for disciplinary proceedings based on malpractice). In one instance, an
uncertified cosmetic surgeon continued his illegal practice for 12 years before the
Board of Medical Quality Assurance filed charges. Numerous police complaints had
been brought to the Board's attention during that time, but only a few physicians had
filed complaints. By the time the Board commenced action, at least $2,329,973 in
malpractice settlements, jury verdicts and default judgments had been awarded to the
surgeon's ex-patients. See L.A. Times, June 1, 1980, Pt. VIII, at 1, col. 2.
43. See E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE 94 (1970).
44. Id. at 94-96; 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 2.04. See also
W. NOLEN, supra note 1 at 166, 168, 185-86; Note, Expulsion and Exclusion From
Hospital Practice and Organized Medical Societies, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 327 (1961).
45. E. FREIDSON, supra note 43, at 94. Proponents of self-regulation by the medi-
cal profession might argue that a physician who is ostracized by colleagues and de-
nied referrals and hospital privileges will eventually leave practice. An ostracized
physician does not always leave practice, however. Instead, such a physician may
transfer his or her practice to a different region or open a clinic or a sole practice.
See also W. NOLEN, supra note 1, at 144 (doctor knew that colleague had failed
to diagnose chest pain as a coronary, but deliberately withheld this information from
the patient); id at 145 (First doctor made an incorrect diagnosis, necessitating an
emergency operation to save a child's life. Author told parent that the child devel-
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for patients injured by the doctor's incompetence.
At the same time, the medical profession insulates itself from
outside review. This insulation "is a powerful social fact which
allows behavior that others . . . would not condone if they knew
of its existence."' 46 Formal and informal mechanisms "protect the
physician from observation . . . through both their structure and
their deliberate nonfunctioning as self-regulatory agencies.
'47
One aspect of this resistance to outside review is the united
front physicians often present when a colleague is sued for mal-
practice. Despite recent advances, 48 this "conspiracy of silence"
continues to make it difficult for plaintiffs to find physicians will-
ing to testify, even in cases of egregious misconduct. 49 Doctors
who do testify risk being boycotted by other physicians,5 0 or losing
their malpractice insurance..' The patient cannot, therefore, de-
pend on peer pressure to motivate physicians to inform him or her
that malpractice has been committed.
A judicially imposed duty of disclosure might prove helpful
to such patients because doctors and nurses who wish to report
oped the condition while in the hospital. "What I'd told them was the truth, sort
of. . . . [T]here was no sense in suggesting that Joe [the other doctor] has missed the
diagnosis. It wouldn't do the family any good and would only hurt Joe. I knew he'd
protect me if the roles were reversed .... .
46. E. KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 40.
47. Id See also W. NOLEN, supra note 1, at 163-68.
48. See notes 1-4 & accompanying text supra; notes 84-108 & accompanying text
infra.
49. IF]or decades, almost no physician would testify that a colleague had
blundered. In the privacy of his office, a doctor might tell you that a
certain brother of the scalpel was a blunderer who, in his gross incom-
petence, had maimed his patient. However, on the witness stand, he
would prejure [sic] himself in firm tones, declaring. the defendant to be
a skilled surgeon exercising his best medical judgment.
Appleman, The Darling Case-A "Real" Tiger, 1975 INs. L.J. 714, 714-15. See
sources cited in note I supra; L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th
Cir. 1968) (insurance company cancelled dentist's policy in order to coerce him not to
testify in malpractice action). See also Christie v. Callahan, 75 App. D.C. 133, 138,
124 F.2d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ("Physicians ... are loath to testify [against] a
fellow craftsman .... "); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal.
App. 2d 560, 568, 317 P.2d 170, 175 (1957) ("No matter how lacking in skill or how
negligent the medical man might be, it was almost impossible to get other medical
men to testify adversely to him."); I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2,
1.05, 7.08, 14.01-.03; W. NOLEN, supra note 1, at 148, 158-59, 207 (doctor lied to pro-
tect reputation of prestigious medical clinic).
50. See Kelner, supra note 1, at 123 ("The doctor willing to testify is inviting
social and professional ostracism in his county medical society-and worse."); id at
125 ("Nightriders" and hospital superiors pressured doctor not to testify in malprac-
tice case.).
51. See, e.g., Klabunde v. Stanley, 16 Mich. App. 490, 168 N.W.2d 450 (1969)
(plaintiff did not want to name his expert witness because the physician had lost his
malpractice insurance following an earlier malpractice case in which he had testified
for plaintiff), rep'd, 384 Mich. 276, 181 N.W.2d 918 (1970).
[Vol. 28:52
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malpractice could do so without the degree of risk that presently
exists. As matters now stand, doctors can justify reporting mal-
practice to the patient only by declaring that their personal sense
of morality or concern for the patient demands it. Some physi-
cians feel that these reasons should be outweighed by a doctor's
loyalty to his or her colleagues. 52 If the duty to report becomes a
legal obligation, physicians could explain to colleagues and supe-
riors that they were merely complying with the law in disclosing
malpractice. Those who came forward could be protected from
vindictive physicians or administrators by doctrines forbidding re-
taliatory conduct.
5 3
A duty to disclose would also place additional pressure on
government agencies and medical societies to take effective action
to reduce the incidence of malpractice. Spurred by the increased
number of cases likely to be brought and their attendant publicity,
existing regulatory mechanisms would gain new life. Thus, the
proposed duty would both aid victims of malpractice and
strengthen the mechanisms designed to prevent malpractice.5 4
B. UnequalAccess to Information
Patients need medical information in order to evaluate their
illnesses and scrutinize the treatment they receive. 55 It is often dif-
52. See, e.g., W. NOLEN, supra note 1, at 148, 160, 165-66 ("Hardly ever does any
doctor on the staff approach any other doctor and question his practice methods. It
just isn't done.").
53. The need for protection against retaliatory action is patent. See note 50
supra. Rules against retaliation exist in other areas of the law. See, e.g., Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (labor law); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (landlord-tenant relations), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969);
Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970)
(landlord-tenant relations); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1432(b) (West 1979) (pa-
tients' rights regarding evictions from health care facilities). These rules against retal-
iation only come into play, however, when the person seeking protection acted to
enforce a legally recognized right; they do not apply to cases in which the person
seeking protection acted solely from moral compulsion. Edwards v. Habib, for in-
stance, granted protection against retaliatory eviction to tenants who availed them-
selves of legislative remedies.
54. The proposed duty to disclose might be extended to apply directly to regula-
tory agencies, in addition to being used to pressure such agencies indirectly. Imposi-
tion of liability would, of course, be rare. To prevail, the plaintiff would have to
prove the elements of the prima facie case, see notes 142-54 & accompanying text
infra, and show that the agency was not protected by sovereign immunity.
55. Aside from their need for information to evaluate treatment, patients may
simply want to know what has happened to them. The Golden Rule supports a duty
to disclose; if we were malpractice victims we would presumably wish to be notified
rather than kept in ignorance of the damage that had been done to our bodies. See J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-49 (1971) (persons should choose moral principles
as though prevented by a veil of ignorance from knowing what position they would
occupy in a society governed by these principles).
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ficult for them to obtain this informatiom 56 Practices and policies
are "deliberately chosen by health-care workers which confuse
and misinform patients, for the convenience of the setting and the
comfort of the workers. '' 57 Although "these [are] . . . under at-
tack by the 'patient rights' movement, . . . the process continues
because it is so deeply embedded in the normal scheme of
things. s58 Health care professionals assume that "expertise
[should] be possessed by one group, and [that] the patient is not
. . . better off with a technical knowledge of his problem." 59 An-
swering questions takes time away from other duties. Also, an in-
formed patient may challenge his or her treatment, demand
information that embarrasses the doctor or staff, or sue. Thus, to
health care workers, it may appear "far easier not to tell the pa-
tient anything unless [required] to do S0. ''60
The surest way to be certain that patients are adequately in-
formed may be to require disclosure of malpractice. Doctors and
nurses are certainly in a better position than patients to know
whether it has occurred; the legal system generally places the bur-
den of disclosure on the party most likely to have access to needed
information.
6'
C. Risk of Further Harm to Patients
Another reason for a duty to disclose malpractice is the risk
of further physical harm if the victim is not notified. In some
cases sponges, clamps, or other items of surgical equipment have
been left in the patient, yet nothing has been said to him or her.62
In other cases, surgical procedures have been carried out improp-
56. See notes 57-60 & accompanying text infra. See also I D. LOUISELL & H.
WILLIAMS, supra note 2, $ 5.03-.04, 6.02 n.1, 7.09 (fear of malpractice suits may
cause alteration of hospital records and destruction of committee reports).
57. E. KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 116. See R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRAN-
GERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS 102 (1979). But see Katz,
Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 140-41
(1977).
58. E. KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 116.
59. Id See also R. BURT, supra note 57, at 124-27; 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 2, 22.01; W. NOLEN, supra note 1, at 145.
60. E. KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 116.
61. See text accompanying notes 84-91 infra (obligations arising from fiduciary
relationship); Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971).
See also W. PROSSER, supra note 27, § 106, at 697.
62. See, e.g., Landgraff v. Wagner, 26 Ariz. App. 49, 546 P.2d 26 (clamp left in
patient), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 806 (1976); Young v. Caspers, 311 Minn. 391, 249
N.W.2d 713 (1977) (broken tip of scalpel left in patient); Hestbeck v. Hennepin
County, 297 Minn. 419, 212 N.W.2d 361 (1973) (sponge left in patient). A complaint
which was recently filed in Santa Monica Superior Court against a primary physician
and a hospital alleges that the physican left a sponge in the patient. It further alleges
that, although the sponge was seen by the radiologist and others at the hospital, no
one told the patient or his wife. The patient died during a further series of operations
[Vol. 28:52
1980] MEDICAL MISTAKES
erly, again without the patient's being notified.63 As a result of
nondisclosure, the victim may suffer complications, including con-
tinued illness or even death. In these cases, there is an obvious
and strong public interest in requiring disclosure so that the pa-
tient may have the object removed or the condition treated.
D. Delayed Recovery and Statutes of Limitations
In a number of states, the statute of limitations does not start
to run until the patient actually discovers the injury or receives
effective notice of it.64 Other states either lack a comparable rule
or set a maximum period after which actions cannot be brought
even if discovery is delayed through no fault on the part of the
patient.65 In either case, the earlier the victim can file, the better-
the longer the delay, the greater the likelihood that evidence will
be destroyed, witnesses will move or die, files will be misplaced or
lost, and memories will fade. In addition, when filing is delayed,
the victim potentially faces medical expenses and loss of income
during the entire period of the delay. 66 This may prove a particu-
larly heavy burden for the members of a family which loses its
allegedly necessitated by the presence of the sponge. Interview with Robert Gans,
M.D., attorney at law, in Westwood, Cal. (Oct. 10, 1979).
63. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976)
(gynecologist performed unsuccessful abortion but did not inform the patient, even
though he received a report from the hospital's pathologist indicating that the fetus
was still in place; the patient did not discover the error until it was too late to have
another abortion); Wambold v. Brock, 236 Iowa 758, 19 N.W.2d 582 (1945) (dentist
fractured patient's jaw while extracting a tooth, but did not tell the patient about the
injury); Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1978)
(surgeon negligently injured a spinal accessory nerve in the patient's neck but con-
cealed the injury from the patient, who did not discover the error until it was too late
for corrective surgery).
64. See, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (1971), modoed,
62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973); Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d
427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969). See also I D. LoUISELL & H. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 2, 13.07 (listing states that have adopted this "discovery rule").
65. See statutes cited in I D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 1 13.07
nn.44, 45 (Supp. 1979). In the period 1975 to 1979, during the height of the "malprac-
tice crisis", a number of states reduced the maximum period set by their statutes of
limitations in order to decrease the number of malpractice suits that could be brought.
See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West Supp. 1980) (reducing the statutory
period for bringing malpractice actions from four to three years); N.Y. CIv. PRAC.
LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1979) (reducing the statutory period from three to
two-and-a-half years). See also 2 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 20.07
(Supp. 1979).
66. It is especially important that victims go to court early---before their damages
increase with time--where the amount which can be recovered in a malpractice ac-
tion has been limited by statute. In California, for example, the legislature reacted to
the malpractice crisis by limiting recovery for noneconomic losses, including pain and
suffering and physical impairment, to $250,000. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West
Supp. 1980). The legislature also restricted subrogation in malpractice cases, CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1980), and limited contingency fees for attorneys
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principal wage-earner. They may, for example, be required to sell
their home and forfeit work or educational opportunities. A re-
covery in ten or twenty years comes too late to remedy these losses
fully. If there is a separate duty to disclose and that duty is not
met, at least victims will be able to recover more compensation
than they would otherwise have been able to obtain. 67 In addi-
tion, the existence of a legal duty may make it more likely that
some member of the treatment team will come forward to report
the original malpractice, making recourse to the new cause of ac-
tion unnecessary.
II. RELATED DEVELOPMENTS IN TORT THEORY
A judicially recognized cause of action for nondisclosure of
malpractice would constitute not a major departure from, but
rather a small and logical next step in a continuous line of tort
doctrine. Courts have recognized that patients are at a disadvan-
tage when they deal with the medical profession, 68 that patients
are almost totally dependent on physicians for medical informa-
tion, 69 and that there are few ways in which a layperson can inde-
pendently ascertain what treatment his or her illness requires. 70
Courts have addressed this imbalance within the doctor-patient
relationship in two ways. They have developed doctrines that
make it less difficult for a victim of malpractice to sue success-
fully,7' and they have placed affirmative duties on physicians to
provide patients with information they need to make informed de-
cisions regarding treatment.72
A. Keeping the Plaintiff in Court Despite the "Conspiracy of
Silence"
Largely in response to the "conspiracy of silence, ' 73 the
representing clients in such actions, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp.
1980).
67. The victim should be able to recover for nondisclosure from members of the
treatment team even if he or she is unable to recover for the original malpractice
because of the death, retirement, or absence from the jurisdiction of the malpracticing
physician.
68. Eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9,104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
513 (1972).
69. See, e.g., cases cited in note 68 supra, Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350
P.2d 1093 (1960). See also notes 55-61 & accompanying text supra (patients' access to
information restricted).
70. See cases cited in notes 68, 69 supra.
71. See notes 73-79 & accompanying text infra.
72. See notes 96-101 & accompanying text infra.
73. See note I supra. Substantive considerations, such as burden-shifting in or-
der to advantage plaintiffs at the expense of stubbornly silent defendants, may have
also played a part in the development of these doctines.
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courts have allowed plaintiffs to use res ipsa loquitur,74 estab-
lished national standards for expert witnesses, 75 permitted plain-
tiffs to substitute medical books for expert testimony,76 and
allowed plaintiffs to dispense with expert testimony altogether
under certain circumstances. 77 Unfortunately, these doctrines as-
sist only the victim who knows about the malpractice and is trying
to prove it in court. The cases that come nearest to recognizing
the problem of nondisclosure are those in which the statute of lim-
itations is held not to start running until the victim discovers or
should discover his or her injury.78 The rationale for this "discov-
74. To establish that res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself') can be ap-
plied to a case, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the injury or the event that caused the
injury is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negli-
gence; (2) that the injury or event was caused by an agency or instrumentality within
the exclusive control of the defendant; and, (3) that the injury or event was not due to
any voluntary action or contribution by the plaintiff. W. PROSSER, supra note 27, §39,
at 214. Some courts have suggested that the plaintiff must also show that the true
explanation of the event causing the injury is more readily accessible to the defendant
than to the plaintiff. Id In some jurisdictions, proof of these elements creates a re-
buttable presumption that the defendant's negligence caused the injury. If the de-
fendant fails to rebut the presumption, the plaintiff prevails. Id § 40, at 230-31. In
most jurisdictions, proof of the requisite elements will entitle the jury to infer negli-
gence, but creates no presumption of it. Id at 228-30. Where a special relationship,
such as that between doctor and patient, exists between plaintiff and defendant, a
court is more likely to apply the rebuttable presumption version of the doctrine, how-
ever. Id at 231. See also Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 426 P.2d 525, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 125 (1967); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); 1 D. LouI-
SELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 14.04-.05.
75. At one time, expert witnesses were required to have practiced in the geo-
graphic area where the malpractice occurred in order to testify about the medical
standard of care in that area. While this rule prevailed, a plaintiffs chances of finding
a doctor willing to testify were miniscule. J. KING, JR., supra note 2, at 72-78. Most
jurisdictions have discarded this rule, however, on the ground that recent improve-
ments in communications technology have created a national medical standard of
care; plaintiffs can now introduce medical'experts from other parts of the country.
See, e.g., Christopher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Murphy v.
Little, 112 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965); Chandler v. Neosho Memorial
Hosp., 223 Kan. 1, 574 P.2d 136 (1977); Tallbull v. Whitney, 172 Mont. 326, 564 P.2d
162 (1977); Hirschberg v. New York, 91 Misc. 2d 590, 398 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1977). Fur-
ther, many jurisdictions have relaxed the requirement that the expert be a specialist in
the type of medicine involved in the suit. See I D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra
note 2, 11.30 n.23.
76. Some states permit plaintiffs to show, with the aid of medical books, that the
doctor's conduct fell below the customary standard in the medical profession. See 1
D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 8.01 n.10; Note, Statutory and Common
Law Innovations, supra note 1, at 1019.
77. The plaintiff can dispense with expert testimony when the type of injury is
such that expert testimony is unnecessary to show negligence. See, e.g., Higdon v.
Carlebach, 348 Mich. 363, 83 N.W.2d 296 (1957) (dentist's drill cut patient's tongue);
Hestbeck v. Hennepin County, 297 Minn. 419, 212 N.W.2d 361 (1973) (foreign object
left in body); Griffin v. Norman, 192 N.Y.S. 322 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (dentist removed
wrong tooth).
78. A number of states have adopted this "discovery" rule. See, e.g., Lipsey v.
Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 450 (1970); Tomlinson v. Siehl, 459
UCLA LAW REVIEW
ery rule" is that patients often rely on their physicians and have
no independent means of discovering negligence in treatment.
Victims now often discover negligence by accident.79 The pro-
posed duty would enable them to learn about malpractice without
having to rely on chance.
B. Affirmative Duties and Medical Malpractice
Traditionally, the common law did not impose affirmative
duties in the absence of a special relationship between the par-
ties. 80 Thus, neither bystanders nor physicians have ever been re-
quired to render aid in an emergency. 81 The common law
attempted, instead, to "encourage" rescue by means of "Good Sa-
maritan" statutes: 82 in return for rendering aid at the scene of an
emergency, doctors were protected from liability for negligence
and sometimes allowed to collect fees from the victim.
83
Recent tort cases have altered the common law, often by ex-
panding the "special relationship" concept.8 4 For example, where
one party is dependent on another for information or knowledge
S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970); Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (1971),
modified, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973); Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24
N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969); 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS,
supra note 2, 13.07 nn.44-49 & Supp. 13.07, at 224-25. For example, in Lopez v.
Swyer, the plaintiff was seriously burned during radiation treatments for cancer but
did not discover the radiologist's negligence until after the statute of limitations had
run. The Appellate Division held that the statute should be tolled until the patient
"discovered or should have discovered" that the treatment was negligently adminis-
tered. The New Jersey Supreme Court modified the decision, holding that the ques-
tion of the "discovery" rule and the statute of limitations is to be decided by the trial
judge, not the jury.
79. See, e.g., Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (1971) (victim
overheard other radiologists discussing the malpractice), modified, 62 N.J. 267, 300
A.2d 563 (1973).
80. The basis for this rule seems to lie in notions of liberty and laissez faire eco-
nomics: it is less onerous to require persons to refrain from injuring others than to
require them to give positive aid. For an example of a situation where a court found a
special relationship which compelled the creation of an affirmative obligation, see
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 343, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 23 (1976). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 27, § 56, at 338-43; Franklin,
Vermont Requires Rescue.- A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51, 51-53 (1972); Note,
Stalking the Good Samaritan.- Communists, Capitalists and the Duty to Rescue, 1976
UTAH L. REV. 529, 529-32 [hereinafter cited as Note, Stalking the Good Samaritan].
81. See, e.g., 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 21.01-.34.
82. See id; W. PROSSER, supra note 27, § 56, at 344.
83. See note 82 supra. But see 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2,
21.40 nn.75-95 (some states protect "Samaritan" doctors from liability only if they
render aid gratuitously).
84. One case even extended the duty to rescue far beyond the special relationship
requirement. In Farwell v. Keeton, 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976), the court
held that the defendant had a duty to obtain medical aid for his injured friend follow-
ing an accident. The court based its conclusion on a finding that the defendant and
the friend were on a "joint venture" when they went out together for an "evening of
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that only the first party possesses, the courts have imposed "fiduci-
ary" obligations on the party in the superior position.8 5 Physi-
cians, like most professionals, 86 are considered fiduciaries vis-a-vis
their patients.87 Fiduciaries have an affirmative duty to disclose
all information relevant to the protected party's interests, includ-
ing information regarding any loss or injury caused by the fiduci-
ary.88 Failure to disclose constitutes misrepresentation and is
compensable in an action for tort.89 Despite their characterization
of physicians as fiduciaries for other purposes, the courts have
generally not interpreted the principle of affirmative disclosure to
require disclosure of the physician's own malpractice. 90 The crea-
tion of a duty to disclose would put the medical relationship on
the same legal footing as other fiduciary relationships. 9'
recreation." Id at 291-92, 240 N.W.2d at 222. No other court seems to have gone
this far in establishing a duty to rescue.
There is, however, a line of commercial cases which could conceivably be ex-
tended to impose a duty of disclosure on members of the treatment team who observe,
but do not commit, malpractice. These cases hold that persons acting in concert with
fiduciaries are required to meet "fiduciary" standards of fairness. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 588-89 (1921); Miller v. Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255, 281
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). Thus, in those jurisdictions that require the malpracticing physician
to disclose malpractice, observing members of the treatment team might also be re-
quired to disclose malpractice.
85. See, e.g., Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945)
(stockbroker); Knapp v. Knapp, 15 Cal. 2d 237, 100 P.2d 759 (1940) (trustee); Ruther-
ford v. Rideout Bank, II Cal. 2d 479, 80 P.2d 978 (1938) (banker). For a general
discussion of fiduciary obligations, see Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct., Spec.
Term 1944) (fiduciaries must subordinate their personal interests to the interests of
their clients).
86. Lawyers, too, are considered fiduciaries. See, e.g., Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d
176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971); Schaefer v. Berinstein, 140 Cal. App. 2d
278, 295 P.2d 113 (1956).
87. See, e.g., Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 25 Cal. 2d 226, 235, 153 P.2d 325, 329-
30 (1944); Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 139 Cal. App. 2d 326, 331, 293 P.2d 816, 820 (1956);
Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 251, 279 A.2d 116, 124 (1971), modfied, 62 N.J.
267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973).
88. See, e.g., Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837
(197 1) (statute of limitations tolled because of attorney's failure to disclose legal mal-
practice); Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945) (stockbro-
ker concealed his wrong-doing); Knapp v. Knapp, 15 Cal. 2d 237, 100 P.2d 759 (1940)
(statute of limitations tolled because trustee had concealed his wrongdoing from cli-
ent); Rutherford v. Rideout Bank, 11 Cal. 2d 479, 80 P.2d 978 (1938) (banker con-
cealed his fraud); Schaefer v. Berinstein, 140 Cal. App. 2d 278, 295 P.2d 113 (1956)
(attorney concealed his fraud).
89. See W. PROSSER, supra note 27, § 106, at 697 (rule applies to banker and
client, principal and agent, executor and beneficiary, lawyer and client).
90. See, e.g., Millett v. Dumais, 365 A.2d 1038 (Me. 1976) (doctor has no obliga-
tion to give patient "legal advice" by disclosing malpractice). But see Lopez v. Swyer,
115 N.J. Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (1971) (where radiologist concealed malpractice by
telling patient that x-ray burns were a normal part of treatment, statute of limitations
tolled until patient discovered malpractice), modfed, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563
(1973).
91. No case has articulated reasons for the current disparate treatment. Perhaps
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A few courts have recognized an obligation on the part of the
primary physician to disclose the injury-to the patient.92 Failure
to inform is viewed either as a breach of the doctor's duty of due
care and thus as part of the original malpractice, 93 or as misrepre-
sentation by silence. 94
There are two difficulties with assimilating the duty of disclo-
courts have treated physicians differently because the duties performed by physicians
are different in nature from those performed by other fiduciaries. Other fiduciaries
invest money, draft legal documents, or manage the business affairs of the client.
Therefore, a disclosure of a financial loss, unwise investment, or other failure of man-
agement can quite naturally be seen as an aspect of the duty which the fiduciary owes
the client.
With respect to disclosure of medical malpractice, the case is less clear. Disclo-
sure of a slip of the knife, an incorrect injection, or the improper setting of a fracture
may be seen as a legal duty, not a medical one. Thus, courts may have refrained from
making disclosure an aspect of the malpracticing physician's fiduciary obligation be-
cause they felt that disclosure was a nonmedical matter. See Millett v. Dumais, 365
A.2d 1038, 1041 (Me. 1976) (declining to require disclosure of malpractice because
such disclosure would require the physician to make a "legal" judgment).
92. See, e.g., Stafford v. Shultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 270 P.2d 1 (1954); Pashley v.
Pacific Elec. Ry., 25 Cal. 2d 226, 153 P.2d 325 (1944); Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 139 Cal.
App. 2d 326, 293 P.2d 816 (1956); Bowman v. McPheeters, 77 Cal. App. 2d 795, 176
P.2d 745 (1947); Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (1971), modofed,
62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973). See also Hagman, supra note 21, at 767, 803.
It should be noted that, since most instances of medical malpractice do not pre-
sent grounds for criminal prosecution, I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2,
15.01, the fifth amendment does not provide physicians with an excuse for nondisclo-
sure.
93. See, e.g., Millett v. Dumais, 365 A.2d 1038, 1041 (Me. 1976); Simcuski v.
Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 452, 377 N.E.2d 713, 718, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 264-65 (1978).
94. See, e.g., Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 34-35, 198 P.2d 590, 595 (1948)
(failure to disclose was constructive fraud); Stafford v. Shultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 771, 270
P.2d 1, 7 (1954) (doctor had responsibility as fiduciary to make full disclosure to pa-
tient); Sperandio v. Clymer, 563 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. 1978) (surgeon guilty of conspiracy
to keep patient unaware of malpractice of other doctors); Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J.
Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (1971), modoed, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973) (failure to
disclose constituted constructive misrepresentation). See also sources cited in I D.
LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, $ 4.15.
While misrepresentation is, of course, a tort of intent, it is unclear whether non-
disclosure would be characterized by most courts as an intentional or as a negligent
tort. Characterization of nondisclosure as an intentional tort would make punitive
damages available to plaintiffs, 2 D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 1 18.12
(punitive damages available for intentional malpractice), and prevent physicians from
relying on malpractice insurance to cover plaintiffs' recoveries, id 11 20.02, 20.03 n.27
(most malpractice policies do not cover intentional torts). Thus, if nondisclosure were
labeled an intentional tort, physicians would be forced to pay large judgments out of
their personal funds. It is difficult to know whether most courts would view this as a
positive result which advanced deterrence and compensation interests, or as an un-
duly harsh punishment of physicians.
An action for nondisclosure might even sound in contract; it could be argued that
a doctor who assumes responsibility for the care of a patient enters an implied con-
tract to tell the patient of any injuries caused by the doctor's negligence. Historically,
malpractice actions were commonly brought under theories of express or implied con-
tract. See generally I D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 8.03, at 197, 199.
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sure to the doctor's duty of due care. The first is that doctor's care
ordinarily connotes the diagnosis and treatment of disorders. A
duty to inform patients of untoward consequences of treatment
seems to go somewhat beyond a duty to treat them with due care,
especially when the consequences of nondisclosure are only eco-
nomic, not physical. The second difficulty is that the duty of due
care, like most tort duties, is a negative one-to avoid harming the
patient. The proposed duty to disclose, in contrast, would be an
affirmative duty.
The difficulty with relying on a misrepresentation theory, sm-
pliciter, is that misrepresentation generally must be active, rather
than passive, in the absence of special circumstances or relation-
ships. Neither conceptualization seems expandable to reach ob-
serving members of the treatment team who fail to disclose the
primary physician's malpractice.95 Finally, an independent duty
would give parties notice of their rights and obligations and avoid
contorting existing theories to reach a result that can be reached
more naturally by recognizing a separate duty.
No court has, to our knowledge, imposed a duty of disclosure
on members of the treatment team who do not commit malprac-
tice, but observe it and keep silent. These persons already have a
duty to treat patients with due care; strong policy reasons support
extending this duty to require disclosure of malpractice to the pa-
tient. Moreover, existing tort doctrines support the expansion of
this duty.
1. Duty to Obtain Informed Consent
The rationale for a duty to disclose on the part of the primary
physician is similar to that which underlies the doctrine of in-
formed consent.96 The primary purpose of requiring the patient's
This theory, however, has "withered [,]. .. superseded" by theories of negligence or
battery. Id.
The physician's duty of due care and the damages available to the plaintiff would
be the same, whether an action for nondisclosure sounded in negligence or contract.
Id See also 2 id 18.14, at 560. Since, however, the common understanding of the
doctor's obligation to care for patients does not encompass reporting untoward results
of the doctor's own mistreatment, it seems unlikely that the implied contract theory
can be used to impose a duty to disclose malpractice.
95. For example, an anesthesiologist who performs his or her tasks in the opera-
ting room with due care, but observes the primary physician negligently damage an
organ, has done nothing negligent vis-A-vis the patient. The anesthesiologist has un-
dertaken to provide only one service-anesthesia--and by competently providing this
service, fufills his or her traditional duty of due care. Similarly, the anesthesiologist's
nondisclosure would not constitute traditional misrepresentation. At best, the anes-
thesiologist would be under a duty to disclose mistakes he or she personally made in
providing anesthesia.
96. For a discussion of informed consent, see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d
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informed consent is to enable the patient to make intelligent,
knowledgeable choices about his or her treatment. 97 Since "pa-
tients are generally persons unlearned in the medical sciences and
therefore, except in rare cases, courts may safely assume the
knowledge of patient and physician are not in parity,"98 courts
require that physicians inform the patient of his or her diagnosis
and prognosis, and explain the risks and benefits of alternative
treatments. 99 A patient's need for information is not confined to
the period before treatment, however.1°° If malpractice occurs,
the patient must decide how to remedy the injury. If a satisfactory
nonlegal remedy is impossible, then the patient must decide
whether or not to seek compensation in the courts. Information
concerning malpractice is critical to both these decisions.
The policies which, along with the primary interest in re-
specting the patient's autonomy, underlie the doctrine of informed
consent also support a duty to disclose. These policies include:
instilling a sense of joint venture in the doctor-patient relation-
ship, increasing public visibility of treatment decisions, and
prompting professional self-scrutiny with respect to medical deci-
1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Hagman, supra note 21, at 803-08. In a very narrow
range of cases, the doctrine of informed consent can be used directly, rather than by
analogy, to impose a duty of disclosure on physicians. The doctrine should apply, for
example, where a physician negligently damages an unconscious patient's organ in
the course of surgery. If the surgical error requires corrective measures, the physician
will need to obtain the patient's informed consent for the repair procedures, as these
could not have been contemplated in the initial agreement with the patient. To ob-
tain the second consent, the doctor will need to reveal to the patient that the organ
was damaged during surgery.
Unfortunately, the informed consent doctrine can be used to impose a duty to
disclose only where: (1) the physician retains post-treatment responsibility for the
patient's care; (2) the physician personally carries out remedial measures; and (3) the
remedial measures were not included in the original consent agreement with the pa-
tient. Because these three requirements do not appear together in many cases, the
informed-consent rationale cannot often be used directly to impose a broad duty of
disclosure on the primary physician. And, of course, the duty to obtain informed
consent runs only to the treating physician, not to the other members of the treatment
team.
97. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505, 513 (1972) (primary purpose of doctrine is to protect patients' autonomy
interests).
98. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d at 242, 502 P.2d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
99. Id Some courts have also required physicians to inform patients about their
own medical skills. See, e.g., Larsen v. Yelle, 310 Minn. 521, 246 N.W.2d 841 (1976)
(doctor required to disclose to patient that the doctor lacked specialized skills needed
to treat patient and that patient should see a specialist; doctor who fails to do this will
be held to specialist's standard of care); King v. Flamm, 442 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1969)
(physician has duty to refer patient to consultant if physician is unqualified to treat
patient).
100. See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra (risk of further injury if malpractice
is not disclosed).
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sions.lc To create a sense of shared enterprise between patient
and physician, the patient must be advised of actions taken during
the course of the "partnership." Public visibility of treatment de-
cisions will, of course, be heightened by a disclosure requirement.
Finally, the imposition of a duty to disclose malpractice may
prompt some physicians to evaluate their procedures and skills.
2. Joint Venture or Collective Responsibility
In Ybarra v. Spangard,0 2 the plaintiff underwent surgery for
appendicitis and emerged with severe injury to his shoulder and
right arm. The court permitted the use of res ipsa loquitur against
all members of the treatment team because the plaintiff had been
unable, despite due efforts, to find out which one caused the in-
jury. In a hospital, a patient is treated by a number of different
medical personnel with different "contractual" relations with each
other. 10 3 The court said that neither "the number [n]or the rela-
tionship of the defendants alone determines whether the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur applies."'' 4 The crucial fact was that the
plaintiff was in the "custody"' 05 of these defendants, each of
whom owed him a duty of due care, whether or not the particular
defendant actually caused the injury or "so neglected [the patient]
as to allow injury to occur.' °0
By parallel reasoning, a failure to disclose malpractice to a
victim could be seen as a violation of a larger duty of care owed
by all members of the treatment team. 0 7 Nondisclosure could be
held to be a form of "neglect" which allows economic or medical
injuries to occur. Confronted with a flagrant case of nondisclo-
sure, a court might use the "custodial" rationale formulated in
Ybarra to impose an affirmative duty to disclose on all members
of the treatment team who witness malpractice. Timely disclosure
would then be necessary to discharge a treatment team member's
duty of care. Permitting the duty to rest on the malpracticing phy-
sician alone would be insufficient, since that physician has the
greatest incentive not to disclose. For the patient's welfare, other
members of the treatment team should be subject to the duty as
well.
In Ybarra, the plaintiff knew, by the very nature of the injury,
101. See J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 540-608 (1972).
102. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
103. Id. at 491, 154 P.2d at 690.
104. Id.
105. Id
106. Id at 492, 154 P.2d at 690.
107. See also notes 134-41 & accompanying text infra (discussion of enterprise
liability theory utilized in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories).
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that his treatment had been improper. 08 In many other cases,
malpractice is not so obvious. Given the reluctance of the medical
profession to report malpractice, the most effective way to aid the
victims in such cases is to'mandate disclosure and make nondis-
closure actionable.
3. Duty to Warn
In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,10 9 the
California Supreme Court established that a psychotherapist has a
duty to warn a third party whom he or she believes the patient is
likely to harm."10 In deciding to impose this duty, the court
weighed several factors: (1) foreseeability of harm to the victim;
(2) certainty that the victim would suffer injury; (3) closeness of
the connection between the plaintiff's conduct and defendant's in-
jury; (4) moral blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct; (5)
need for preventing future harm; (6) extent of the burden on the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing such a
duty; and (7) availability of insurance to cover the cost of the
harm.II The court imposed a duty to warn even though the ther-
apist did not have a special or "fiduciary" relationship with his
patient's intended victim."1
2
An even better case can be made for a duty to report mal-
practice than can be made for the duty the court imposed in
Tarasoff. A special relationship exists between the members of
the team and the victim of malpractice; in Tarasoff there was no
such relationship between the therapist and the victim. Moreover,
the seven factors listed by the court all seem to support the crea-
tion of a duty to disclose malpractice. It is foreseeable that failure
to disclose will cause harm to the victim."13 The likelihood that
this additional harm will occur is substantial." 4 Failure to dis-
close is causally connected to the harm suffered by the patient.
108. The patient entered the hospital for treatment of an inflamed appendix and
emerged with injuries to his arm and shoulder. See text accompanying note 102
supra.
109. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
110. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 347-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28. For a general discus-
sion of a physician's liability to third parties, see Hirsh, Physician's Legal Liability to
Third Parties who are not Patients, 1977 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 388.
111. These factors were originally set out in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
117, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968).
112. See 17 Cal. 3d at 434, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
113. See notes 62-63 & accompanying text supra (physical harm from nondisclo-
sure); note 66 & accompanying text supra (financial harm from nondisclosure).
It is foreseeable, as well, that failure to disclose may harm a malpracticing physi-
cian'sfuture patients as the physician may repeat the malpractice. Therefore, a physi-
cian who failed to report another's malpractice could arguably be liable to patients
who are later injured by the malpracticing physician.
114. Although the likelihood of further physical harm will vary from case to case,
[Vol. 28:52
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Such failure is "blameworthy" behavior. 1 5 Requiring the pri-
mary physician and other members of the treatment team to tell
the victim about malpractice would enable the victim to take ap-
propriate action to avoid future physical and economic harm.
6
The burden on defendants would be mitigated by the circum-
stance that virtually all physicians purchase malpractice insur-
ance, while few victims have sufficient disability insurance to
cover the costs of the malpractice.
1 7
4. Hospital's Duty to Supervise
A hospital can generally be held vicariously liable for the
negligent actions of its employees.' 8 Recent cases have gone fur-
ther and imposed a duty to supervise physicians with visiting priv-
ileges" 9 as well as hospital staff physicians. 20 Courts have based
this duty to supervise on the hospital's obligation to protect pa-
tients against incompetent physicians and other medical work-
financial harm in some degree will almost always occur. See note 66 & accompany-
ing text supra.
115. It might be argued that a doctor's failure to disclose is not blameworthy be-
cause nondisclosure is the norm in the medical profession, and what is "normal" can-
not be immoral. This equation of morality and common practice is untenable; what is
and what ought to be are separate concepts. See G. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 18
(1903) (describing this "naturalist fallacy"). See also Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,
502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1971) (rejecting medical community's standard for
informed consent); Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (rejecting
medical community's standard for glaucoma tests). Although physicians' special ex-
pertise gives some plausibility to the suggestion that they should be permitted to set
their own standards regarding difficult technical matters, the development of doc-
trines such as the common knowledge exception to the expert testimony requirement
and objective standards for informed consent demonstrates that this approach has
limits.
116. Physical harm can be ameliorated by taking needed medical action; financial
harm, by initiating suit.
117. It might be argued that a malpractice victim's private insurance can provide
appropriate compensation without the legal battle required to establish malpractice
and thereby collect from the physician's malpractice insurance. Patients should not,
however, have to bear the cost of protecting themselves against malpractice. Further,
few consumers will be able to afford the amount of insurance necessary to protect
against medical calamities and the resulting losses. Physicians can afford such insur-
ance. Moreover, shifting the losses resulting from malpractice to the patient would be
fair only if it were widely known that physicians injure their patients and then conceal
the fact of injury. See Calabresi, The Problem of Malpractice. Trying to Round Out
the Circle, 27 U. TORONTO L. REV. 131, 132 (1977) (disclosure of malpractice risks to
public would promote free-market choices with respect to medical care).
118. See J. KING, JR., supra note 2, at 301-02; 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS,
supra note 2, 16.01, .07.
119. See, e.g., Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972) (hospi-
tal held liable when it permitted surgeon with visiting privileges to perform operation
while on notice that surgeon was not competent to do so).
120. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 IUI. 2d 326,
211 N.E.2d 253 (1965) (hospital has duty to supervise staff physician), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 946 (1966). See also I D. LOUiSELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 1 16.07-.08.
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ers.' 2' Because the hospital is in a position to evaluate the
competence of physicians who practice there, it is required to ex-
ercise care to see that these physicians are, in fact, competent.
22
Once the hospital is on notice of a physician's incompetence,
therefore, the physician's status as an independent contractor will
not shield the hospital from liability.
23
The reasons that support liability for hospitals whose man-
agement knowingly permits incompetent physicians to practice
there also support a duty to disclose malpractice. 24 In our para-
digms, as in Ybarra, the victim is in the custody of the entire treat-
ment team, whose members share a responsibility for the patient's
well-being. 25 Given that in such situations courts may impose a
duty to supervise on a hospital, it requires only a small doctrinal
step to hold all members of the treatment team liable for nondis-
closure. The relationship between the members of the team and
the victim is even more direct than the relationship between the
hospital administrator and an incompetent surgeon. Members of
the team actually witness the malpractice; their liability would not
be derivative or vicarious. Rather, it would arise from specific
conduct: witnessing flagrant malpractice perpetrated on an un-
conscious patient and yet keeping silent.
121. The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the pa-
tient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but un-
dertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their own
responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their
manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish
facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large
staff of physicians, nurses, and internes, as well as administrative and
manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care and treat-
ment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Cer-
tainly, the person who avails himself of "hospital facilities" expects that
the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other em-
ployees will act on their own responsibility.
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 11 (1957), quoted
in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 332, 211 N.E.2d
253, 257 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
122. See notes 118-21 & accompanying text supra. On the same theory, the Hos-
pital Accreditation Board encourages hospitals to exercise some degree of control
over doctors and other health care personnel in the hospital.
123. See Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 80-81, 500 P.2d 335, 341 (1972).
124. The policies underlying the hospital's duty and the duty to disclose differ in
one respect. In the hospital supervision cases, there is a strong public interest in
encouraging the hospital to root out incompetent doctors. In disclosure cases, there is
no public interest in ejecting from the medical profession an otherwise competent
physician who has committed one act of malpractice. There are strong public inter-
ests, however, in ensuring that the patient is compensated for the malpractice, in pub-
lic disclosure of the facts surrounding the malpractice, and in preserving the symbolic
value of disclosure.
125. The duty posits a collective undertaking to care for the patient; doctors pres-
ent as students or observers would not be under a duty to disclose.
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5. Duty Not to Impede Rescue
There exists a common law duty not to interfere with, or dis-
courage, rescue.126 In a typical law school hypothetical, A pushes
B, who cannot swim, off a bridge in full view of a crowd of on-
lookers. As B struggles to remain afloat, C, D, and E, members of
the local swim club, announce to the crowd that no one need be
concerned; they will save B. They swim to B's side, but on recog-
nizing him as a teacher who has given them low grades, they re-
turn to shore alone. B drowns. Others in the crowd are prepared
to testify that had C, D, and E not declared their intention to
rescue B, they would have done so themselves. Under these cir-
cumstances C, D, and E, who ordinarily would have had no obli-
gation to aid B, 127 are liable for his death.
128
This duty not to discourage rescue could be applied to certain
instances of medical nondisclosure. It would apply directly to
cases in which some members of the treatment team told another
member, who appeared disposed to disclose malpractice to the pa-
tient, that he or she need not disclose since they had already done
so or were on the verge of doing so. If the second member then
refrained from reporting the malpractice to the patient, who re-
mained ignorant of it, the first group could then be held liable for
"impeding rescue." This liability would result only where at least
one member of the treatment team testified that he or she had
been prepared to report malpractice to the patient, that other
members of the team assured him or her that this was not neces-
sary, and that he or she consequently refrained from disclosing the
information. Because the problems of proof with regard to these
elements are formidable, the number of malpractice cases in
which the discouragement of rescue doctrine could be applied is
likely to be small.
There are two ways in which the original doctrine could be
extended to impose a much broader duty, however. First, each
member of a treatment team or hospital staff might be considered
a potential rescuer who had been dissuaded from disclosure by
126. W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 407-09 (5th ed.
1971).
127. A person is generally under no duty to aid another in peril, a circumstance
that Prosser considers "revolting to any moral sense." W. PROSSER, supra note 27,
§ 56, at 341. But see Landes & Posner, Saviors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other
Rescuers- An Economic Study of Law andAltruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978) (de-
veloping an economic model of rescue and affirmative duties and suggesting that the
law develop these and related doctrines when they promote economic efficiency).
128. "But further, if the defendant does attempt to aid him, and takes charge and
control of the situation, he is regarded as entering voluntarily into a relation which is
attended with responsibility." W. PROSSER, supra note 27, § 56, at 343. See generally
Franklin, note 80 supra Note, Stalking the Good Samaritan, note 80 supra.
1980]
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indirect pressures exerted by the team or the hospital. 129 Each in-
dividual participating in this conditioning process would become
liable for the nonrescue of the patient. Alternatively, the behavior
of the team members or hospital staff might be seen as calculated
to lull the patient into a false sense of security, thereby deterring
the patient from initiating self-rescue. 30 Medical personnel might
give the patient the impression that the procedure or operation
went smoothly when in fact it did not. If overt, this conduct might
constitute active misrepresentation.' 3' But the standards required
to establish misrepresentation and rescue disablement differ since
the policies that underlie the two doctrines differ.'3 2 Therefore,
the discouragement of rescue doctrine might reach situations
where no active misrepresentation would be found. 33
Either type of extension of the rescue duty would result in the
imposition of a widely shared duty to disclose upon persons who
help to create an atmosphere that inhibits rescue in the form of
disclosure. In many respects this result resembles that reached by
the California Supreme Court in the "D.E.S." case, Sindell v. Ab-
boll Laboratories.34 In that case, the court held that drug manu-
facturers bear common liability for injuries caused by improperly
tested and marketed products. 35 A plaintiff who could not prove
129. See notes 23, 49-51 & accompanying text supra (pressures against disclosure).
130. See notes 55-60, 96-101 & accompanying text supra (patients need informa-
tion in order to remedy effects of malpractice).
131. See notes 31, 94 & accompanying text supra.
132. The tort of misrepresentation was created to punish trickery or unethical bar-
gaining practices, W. PROSSER, supra note 27, § 105, at 683-85, while the duty not to
impede rescue was designed to punish those who interfere with another's acts of res-
cue, id § 56, at 343-44.
133. A hypothetical illustrates one such situation: An operating team observes the
head surgeon damage a patient's nerve while distracted by a radio sports program.
All members of the team, including the head surgeon, agree that malpractice has been
committed, but make a pact not to tell the patient. On awakening, the patient notices
paralysis but assumes that it is a normal result of the operation. Soon after discharge
from the hospital, the patient dies in an automobile accident caused by his impaired
coordination from the paralysis. While it might stretch doctrine to conclude that the
members of the operating team are guilty of misrepresentation, they clearly failed to
take action to protect the patient from danger. Suppose, however, that after the
agreement had been struck, one member of the team had approached the others and
expressed misgivings, indicating an intention to inform the patient of the malpractice.
If the other members of the team threatened the wavering member until he or she
agreed not to "rescue" the patient, the impairment of rescue doctrine would apply,
even though traditional misrepresentation did not occur.
134. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, ceri. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
3270 (1980) (No. 80-172). It is unclear whether the court based its holding on a negli-
gence theory or on a strict liability theory, although the tort of nondisclosure would
generally sound in negligence. Nevertheless, cases involving the duty to disclose
would share the policy underpinnings of Sindell. For example, the Sindell court's
reasoning echoed that of the cases which allowed malpractice victims to use the tort
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See notes 4, 74, 102-06 & accompanying text supra.
135. 26 Cal. 3d at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46. The prod-
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that she was injured by the products of a certain pharmaceuticals
manufacturer was permitted to sue all of the makers of the prod-
uct. The court found that if liability was shown, each maker
would be liable for a portion of the victim's damages.
136
The Sindell court's reasoning could be applied to medical
malpractice cases. The manufacturers' wrongful acts in marketing
medicines without adequate disclosure of their dangers can be
compared to the medical team's or hospital's actions in concealing
a patient's injury. In Sindell and in malpractice cases, there are
marked disparities between the parties in terms of power, 137 access
to information, 38 ability to bear the cost of injury, 139 and fault. 140
In Sindell, the drug companies were required to share the cost
of plaintiffs injuries; each company was held liable for that per-
centage of the plaintiffs damages which corresponded to the com-
pany's market share. ' 4 ' A court might use this formula to regulate
contribution among members of a medical team who conspired to
conceal malpractice from the patient. Courts might reasonably
hesitate to require that each member of the medical team bear full
responsibility for the nondisclosure, since some members occupied
positions of greater authority than others. If, for example, a sur-
geon and four nurses concealed malpractice, causing damage to
the patient in the amount of $500,000, a rule that apportioned the
damages equally would assess each individual with $100,000 dam-
ages. If contribution were required in proportion to team mem-
bers' respective fees for treating the patient, however, the result
would be quite different, and, perhaps, fairer.
The foregoing review of developments in tort doctrine indi-
cates that a court would find a substantial, and growing, body of
uct in question was diethylstilbesterol (D.E.S.), a synthetic form of estrogen marketed
as a drug to prevent miscarriage. Id at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
D.E.S. was later found to cause cancer in the daughters of women who took it. Id at
594, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
136. Id at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
137. Compare 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (drug
companies' power) with note 5 & accompanying text supra (patients' feeling of depen-
dency on physicians).
138. While the plaintiff was unable to trace the medicine her mother had taken to
a particular manufacturer, 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136,
many, of the corporate defendants were able to prove their own noninvolvement and
have the case dismissed as to them, id at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
See also notes 55-60 & accompanying text supra (patients' unequal access to medical
information).
139. Compare 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (ability of
drug manufacturers to bear cost of recovery), with note 117 supra (doctors are better
able to afford malpractice insurance).
140. Compare 26 Cal. 3d at 594, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (drug
companies' fault) with note 115 supra (nondisclosure of malpractice is blameworthy
behavior).
141. See 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
1980]
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support for a duty to disclose malpractice. Each of the doctrines
discussed is consistent with the proposed duty. Their combined
effect suggests that a duty of disclosure is a likely, if not inevitable
outcome of current trends in the law of tort.
III. ELEMENTS OF THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE
A. The Prima Facie Case
If the courts decide to adopt the proposed cause of action for
failure to disclose malpractice, the plaintiff will have to prove the
following elements in order to establish a prima facie case against
either the primary physician or the other members of the treat-
ment team: (1) that there was clear medical malpractice during
treatment; (2) that the primary physician or other members of the
treatment team knew of the malpractice; (3) that one or more of
these persons failed to advise the victim of malpractice; and (4)
that the failure to disclose malpractice caused injury to the victim.
"Clear" malpractice is made an element of the duty in order
to guard against overreporting.142 "Clear" malpractice is mal-
practice that the primary physician or other members of the treat-
ment team would immediately recognize as such. If it consists of
an act, such as leaving a sponge or other surgical instrument in-
side the patient,143 or performing a sexual act on an unconscious
patient 4-something that anyone would recognize as malprac-
142. It might be argued that a patient's interest in knowing about conduct which
might or might not constitute malpractice is just as great as his or her interest in
knowing about "clear" malpractice. Injury to the patient and need for corrective ac-
tion may occur in "borderline" as well as clear cases. Moreover, if the patient is
informed, and can thoroughly investigate the facts, he or she may discover that appar-
ently "borderline" actions in fact constituted clear, actionable malpractice.
"Borderline" cases, however, are cases that a competent attorney might or might
not accept. They are cases in which a judge might or might not grant summary judg-
ment, cases in which the victim might or might not prevail. Therefore, many border-
line cases, by definition, would fail to produce compensation for the patient; extension
of the proposed duty to cover such cases would aid only a limited number of addi-
tional patients.
Also, a duty which required physicians to report borderline cases would present
greater enforcement problems than would a more limited duty. Where the existence
of malpractice was truly a "judgment call," plaintiffs would find it very difficult to
show that the conduct in question fell within the "borderline" area. Judicial experi-
ence with the common knowledge exception to the expert testimony requirement and
objective standards in informed consent cases indicates, however, that courts and ju-
ries would be capable of identifying "clear" malpractice.
For these reasons, the proposed duty to disclose malpractice is limited to cases in
which no reasonable health care professional, in light of his or her training and expe-
rience, could doubt that the act which he or she has seen constitutes malpractice.
143. See notes 62, 77 supra.
144. See the more than 100 cases filed in Sacramento, California, Superior Court
in the early months of 1979 against an anesthesiologist who allegedly inserted his
penis into the mouths of female patients during surgery. The complaints allege that
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tice-then all who witness 45 the act will be under a duty to report
it. If the malpractice is evident only to those with specialized
training, then only they will have a duty to disclose.' 46 In some
cases, the physician's acts will constitute malpractice only if cer-
tain facts (for example, that the patient is a hemophiliac) are
known. In these cases, there is an obligation on the part of the
observing physician to make reasonable inquiry to determine
whether malpractice has occurred.
147
After the plaintiff has established clear malpractice, he or she
next must show that the persons under a duty to disclose did not
notify the plaintiff or the plaintiff's survivors of the malpractice.
Notification must take place reasonably promptly, as inordinate
delay could compound the victim's damages. 48 The duty to dis-
close could be discharged in several ways, so long as the victim
receives actual or effective notice of the malpractice.
149
other treatment team members failed to report the incidents to the disciplinary board
or to the patients. Telephone interview with Mr. Vernon A. Leeper, Program Man-
ager, Enforcement Division, California Board of Medical Quality Assurance, Sacra-
mento, Cal. (Mar. 3, 1980). At the time of writing, the physician was reported to be
"'making. . . progress'" in therapy sessions at Atascadero State Hospital, where he
was sent as a mentally disordered sex offender. L.A. Times, June 4, 1980, Pt. I at 2,
col. 5.
145. It could be proven circumstantially that a given member of the treatment
team actually witnessed malpractice by showing that he or she was in the operating
room while the event took place, that he or she was in a position to view it, or that his
or her duties required that he or she be alert to the actions of the doctor.
146. For example, a subordinate member of a surgical team might not be able to
recognize a serious error on the part of the head surgeon, even though the error would
be obvious to the surgeon's operating assistants.
147. For example, the observing physician might be required to note whether the
patient's chart indicates that the patient is a hemophiliac, or that the left kidney rather
than the right (which appeared during the operation to be normal) should have been
removed. Similar duties to inquire have been placed on physicians in other contexts.
See, e.g., Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979) (physician obligated
to conduct further inquiry into patient's condition when symptoms put him on notice
that patient might be suffering serious, progressive eye disorder). The Gates duty to
inquire furthers objectives very similar to those that underlie the proposed duty to
disclose: avoiding harm and generating knowledge beneficial to the patient.
148. See notes 62-63 & accompanying text supra (patient's physical condition may
deteriorate if malpractice is not discovered promptly). Disclosure need not be instan-
taneous: the observing team member may wish to think, consult colleagues, confront
the primary physician, or review facts upon which the existence of malpractice de-
pends before informing the patient. But if the observing team member delays disclo-
sure without excuse, he or she will be liable for the injuries suffered by the patient
during this period, including pain, suffering, disability, and economic loss.
149. Some persons who observe malpractice may prefer to discharge their duties
to disclose by confronting the malpracticing physician and demanding that he or she
disclose the malpractice to the patient. Subordinate members of the treatment team
may feel more comfortable proceeding up the "chain of command." Or, subordinates
fearful of retaliation might discharge their duties by means of an anonymous letter to
the patient. A xeroxed copy kept on file would satisfy the requirements of proof.
Can the physician discharge the duty by merely telling the patient he or she
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The plaintiff must also show that the failure to disclose
caused injury. 50 The clearest cases are those in which the failure
to disclose results in additional physical injury or suffering.''
The passage of time may render corrective measures even more
painful or difficult than they would have been had they been car-
ried out more promptly.
In other cases, the plaintiff does not suffer additional physical
injury from the nondisclosure but, nonetheless, is prevented from
filing suit immediately. In the second paradigm, 152 for example,
the victim dies as a result of the malpractice. The failure to dis-
close negligent treatment to the survivors delays any action that
they might bring; the relatives must thus suffer loss without receiv-
ing the prompt compensation our legal system is designed to ef-
fect. This injury could be described as "loss or postponement of a
tort claim."'' 53 Although it is different in kind from physical in-
needs more treatment? Suppose a surgeon negligently damages the patient's spleen
during surgery. The surgeon might attempt to discharge the obligation to disclose in
a variety of ways:
(I) by telling the patient that his or her spleen needs a further oper-
ation;
(2) by telling the patient that his or her spleen needs a further oper-
ation because of something that happened during the first operation;
(3) by telling the patient that his or her spleen needs a further oper-
ation because of a medical mistake made during the operation;
(4) by telling the patient that his or her spleen needs a further oper-
ation because of the surgeon's own malpractice.
Statements (1) and (2) place the patient on notice of his or her medical condition
and the need for remedial measures. Thus, they satisfy one of the policy reasons for
disclosure. But other equally significant policies, including compensation and deter-
rence, remain unsatisfied. Therefore, courts should require a statement such as (3)
before the duty to disclose is held to be discharged. Courts should not require (4),
since such a statement might be viewed as a legal judgment that physicians are not
qualified to make. See Millett v. Dumais, 365 A.2d 1038, 1041 (Me. 1976) (doctors
not required to make disclosure because they need not give their patients "legal ad-
vice").
Whatever method of disclosure is used, the person who makes the report should
be protected against retaliation or a defamation suit by a conditional privilege. See
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2124.45 (West Supp. 1980) (conditional privilege for phy-
sicians and surgeons who report improper conduct of other physicians to Board of
Medical Quality Assurance or review committee); W. PROSSER, supra note 27, § 114,
at 776 (privilege in defamation actions "rests upon the.., idea, that conduct which
otherwise would be actionable is to escape liability because the defendant is acting in
furtherance of some interest of social importance"); id. at 777 (privilege conditioned
on good motives, reasonable behavior, and defendant's belief in the truth of state-
ment); id § 115, at 787-89 (privilege to defame in the "interest of others").
150. If the failure to disclose does not cause injury, the plaintiff does not have a
cause of action, no matter how reprehensible the failure is. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 27, § 30, at 143-44.
151. See notes 62-63 & accompanying text supra.
152. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
153. This injury can also be described in other ways. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra
note 27, § 128 ("Injurious Falsehood"); id § 129 ("Interference with Contractual Re-
lations"); id § 130 ("Interference with Prospective Advantage").
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jury, there is some case authority for the proposition that it is re-
coverable in tort. 1
54
B. Defenses
If the foregoing elements are established, the plaintiff will
prevail unless the defendant can offer an acceptable defense. At
least three defenses are available: (1) contributory or comparative
negligence; (2) inability to locate the victim or the victim's rela-
tives; and (3) "therapeutic privilege."
Contributory or comparative negligence' 55 is not a "favored"
defense to a charge of medical malpractice. 56 Patients are enti-
tled to trust their physicians, particularly when they are vulnera-
ble because of disease or injury. 157 However, if a reasonable
person would have known that the injury suffered could only have
been caused by medical negligence, then the defendant might be
able to prove contributory or comparative negligence.' 5 8  Still,
154. See, e.g., Morris v. County of Marin, 18 Cal. 3d 901, 559 P.2d 606, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 251 (1977). In Morris, a construction worker became paraplegic when injured
at work. He was initially unable to recover for his injuries, however, because his
employer, an uninsured licensed contractor, was insolvent. The defendant, County of
Marin, had issued a permit to the contractor, without first ensuring, as it was required
to do under a county regulation, that the contractor had obtained workers' compensa-
tion insurance for its employees. The injured worker sued the county for its failure to
follow the regulation, since this failure resulted in the worker's inability to recover
from his employer. The California Supreme Court held that the county could be held
liable for the worker's loss of his claim against the employer. See also J'Aire Corp. v.
Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal, Rptr. 407 (1979) (court used factors
enumerated in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 117, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 100 (1968), to find cause of action when contractor's delay in construction
caused economic loss to plaintiff); Brousseau v. Jarrett, 73 Cal. App. 3d 864, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 200 (1977) (where doctor misrepresented extent of plaintiff's injuries to insur-
ance company and plaintiff collected only a small settlement as a result, plaintiff had
a cause of action against the doctor); Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa. Super. Ct. 79, 177
A.2d 142, 146 (1962) (doctors "owe their patients ... a duty of total care . . . that
includes and comprehends a duty to aid the patient in litigation") (affirming per
curiam on the opinion of the court below, 25 PA. D. & C.2d 649, 655 (1961)); Arm-
strong v. Morgan, 545 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tex. 1977) (corporate physician gave inaccurate
report of plaintiff's health, with result that plaintiff lost his job; court found cause of
action even though plaintiff's only loss was economic, not physical); Rosenthal v.
Blum, 529 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (where doctor negligently misrepre-
sented plaintiffs injuries to him and he settled with the insurance company for an
unreasonably small sum, plaintiff had a cause of action against the doctor), writ refd,
n. r. e.
155. Contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff bars recovery entirely;
comparative negligence results in apportionment of damages. W. PROSSER, supra
note 27, § 67.
156. See J. KING, JR., supra note 2, at 284-86.
157. Id at 284-85.
158. For example, a patient who entered the hospital for an appendectomy and
emerged from surgery to find that his or her tonsils had been removed would be on
notice of the malpractice and could not complain later that members of the treatment
team did not report it.
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since the patient might not attribute his or her pain and discom-
fort to malpractice, the defendant physician should be required to
show that the injury was so obviously the result of malpractice
that anyone would realize without disclosure that malpractice had
occurred. 15 9
The second defense, attempted disclosure, should succeed
only rarely. A defendant who asserts that he or she had attempted
to disclose the malpractice but could not find the plaintiff will
have to explain why the plaintiff was not told immediately after
the treatment. 160 If the plaintiff was not available for notification,
the defendant will need to explain why the patient's relatives were
not informed. 161
The only defense likely to succeed with any frequency is that
of "therapeutic privilege."'' 62 In a number of jurisdictions, the
duty to obtain informed consent does not exist if disclosure of the
risks of treatment could harm the patient. 163 A similar situation
might arise when a physician defends his or her failure to disclose
malpractice by asserting that disclosure would not have been in
the best medical interest of the patient. A cardiac patient, for ex-
ample, might become so agitated upon learning that the surgeon
repaired the wrong coronary artery as to suffer cardiac arrest. An
ulcer patient informed of medical errors might suffer recurrence of
bleeding.
Several considerations limit the application of therapeutic
privilege, however. First, the privilege cannot last longer than the
condition that justifies it. Once the patient improves, the malprac-
tice must be disclosed. 164 In informed consent situations, many
courts require that when consent cannot be obtained from the pa-
159. Naturally, if the defendant misrepresented the outcome of the treatment to
the patient, the physician would be estopped from asserting the defense--contributory
negligence is not a defense to intentional misrepresentation. W. PROSSER, supra note
27, § 65, at 426.
160. In a rare case, the doctor's duties might require him or her to leave the scene
before the patient awakens, or the patient might unexpectedly leave the hospital
before he or she can be notified. See also notes 162-65 & accompanying text infra
(discussion of "therapeutic privilege").
161. It will be difficult for the defendant to give such an explanation since most
physicians and hospitals require patients to complete financial responsibility forms
that contain the names and addresses of immediate relatives.
162. The doctrine of "therapeutic privilege" permits a physician to refrain from
disclosing matters related to a patient's diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment if he or she
has good reason to believe that disclosure will cause serious harm to the patient.
163. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1,104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
164. Many legal rules are similarly limited in application. See, e.g., I D. Lou)-
SELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, T 8.09 nn.27, 31 (emergency consent doctrine
limited to duration of emergency and authorizes physician to treat only the condition
that produced emergency); id 8.06 ("legal rule [that expert testimony must be lim-
ited to area of malpractice] ceases when the reasons for it cease").
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tient, because of risk to his or her health, the physician must notify
a close relative and obtain his or her consent. 65 Applied to the
disclosure context, this would require that the medical team notify
a close relative that malpractice has occurred. The relative could
then take medical or legal action to protect the patient's interest.
These limitations, which courts have applied in pretreatment situ-
ations, would help ensure that the defense of "therapeutic privi-
lege" would not be applied so broadly as to nullify the duty to
disclose.
IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE
There are several possible objections to the proposed duty to
disclose malpractice to the patient. Opponents of the duty could
argue: (1) that the duty would destroy doctor-patient trust; (2) that
the duty would weaken trust among health care professionals; (3)
that the duty would be ineffective; (4) that the duty would en-
courage false reporting; (5) that the duty would result in higher
medical fees; (6) that the duty would discourage doctors from en-
tering specialized practice; and (7) that the establishment of a duty
to disclose should be left to the legislature.
A. Doctor-Patient Trust
It might be argued that imposing a duty on physicians to dis-
close malpractice would harm doctor-patient trust, either directly
or indirectly. An erosion of trust might stem from the increased
number of malpractice actions that would be filed as a result of
victims' becoming aware of the malpractice they have suffered, as
well as the publicity resulting from these suits. But blind trust-
trust that persists only because the public does not know relevant
facts-is scarcely deserving of legal protection. The public is enti-
tled to know why trust should exist, and to repose the degree of
confidence in the medical profession that it deems warranted. 66
Alternatively, it could be argued that trust might be damaged
165. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d.772 (D.C. Cir.) (notification of relatives
required when patient is unconscious and unable to consent), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); 2 D. LoUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 22.02, .09. But see Karp
v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (disclosure to family not required), a#'d,
493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii
188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970) (disclosure to family not required).
166. The idea that a free flow of information stimulates public trust underlies a
number of legislative reforms of the last decade. See, e.g., City of Davis v. Coleman,
521 F.2d 661, 670 (9th Cir. 1975) (explaining purpose of environmental impact state-
ment); Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975); Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. § 4332 (1976) (provides for filing of environmental impact statements in order
to provide public with information about proposed governmental actions affecting the
environment). For a discussion of the connection between information flow and po-
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simply because of the symbolic effect of adopting a rule of disclo-
sure, which might suggest to the public that doctors, as a group,
are not to be trusted. It seems far from certain that this will result,
however. As matters now stand, patients cannot rely on any mem-
ber of the treatment team to report malpractice. Although many
patients are unaware of this, others have become skeptical of the
medical profession, perhaps because of personal experiences,
friends' experiences, or exposure to the patient-consumer move-
ment. 167 These patients regard physicians warily, seeing malprac-
tice in every unfavorable outcome of treatment. 68 The existence
of an affirmative duty to disclose should strengthen, not weaken,
the trust that these patients have in their physicians. If patients
can expect an observer to come forward even if the primary physi-
cian fails to do so, they will be less likely to resort to surreptitious
inquiries, shopping for a second physician who will accuse the first
of malpractice, or filing lawsuits to discover what happened.
Even if public trust is damaged to some degree, a number of
considerations suggest that this effect might be worth incurring.
First, a society committed to political openness has reason to dis-
trust an ends-justify-the-means argument for ignorance. Indeed,
we have implicitly rejected this argument in the case of politicians
and corporate directors, who are required to make financial dis-
closures even though facts might come to light that could bring an
entire profession into disrepute. Further, knowledge of the extent
of unreported medical negligence might serve as a stimulus for
needed reform. Thus, even if undeserved trust improved the qual-
ity of medical services to some extent, this might not be a sufficient
reason for fostering it.
B. Trust Among Medical Professionals
It could also be argued that a duty to disclose would damage
litical openness, see Delgado, Active Rationality in Judicial Review, 64 MINN. L. REV.
467, 492-99 (1980).
167. For the view that anger and a sense of betrayal on the part of the patient
trigger many malpractice suits, see I D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2,
5.01. Recognizing this, a number of teaching hospitals have recently developed
"risk management" teams, whose objective is to identify promptly instances of mal-
practice committed by physicians in the facility, approach the patient and discuss the
situation honestly and openly, and offer to cancel charges and provide supportive
services as necessary. Interview with Angela Holder, Counsel for Medicolegal Af-
fairs, Yale-New Haven Hospital, in New Haven, Conn. (Sept. 28, 1979). Prompt
disclosure of malpractice, then, far from stirring up malpractice actions, may reduce
their number.
168. See I D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 5.01, .06 ("[tlhe mind [of
the patient] naturally feeds upon uncertainties rooted in a lack of understanding"




trust and confidence among health care professionals, as each
might come to regard his or her colleagues as potential infor-
mants. In evaluating this objection, it is important to recall that
the medical profession discourages disclosure of malpractice.
69
The trust that currently exists among doctors and between doctors
and nurses thus tends to protect incompetent professionals at the
expense of their patients. 170 Those who practice medicine with
due care do not need-and should not want-such protection.
It might be urged that even competent and caring profession-
als have reason to fear a requirement of disclosure. An attitude of
constant watchfulness among, for example, the members of an op-
erating team, could impair their rapport and ability to work to-
gether. 17 1 The truth of this assertion is far from self-evident,
however. Police officers are required to work in close cooperation
under conditions of great stress;172 yet few would urge that police
officers be relieved of the duty to report graft or brutality on the
part of fellow officers. 173 There seems little reason to treat physi-
cians differently.
Another variant of this objection is the argument that a duty
to report malpractice would harm doctor-doctor relations because
colleagues would be required to disclose the rare slip of an other-
wise competent, even superb, physician. It could be argued that
this would place an intolerable strain on physicians who are al-
ready keenly aware of their own fallibility. 174 This objection is
misconceived, for the malpractice standard does not require
perfection; it merely requires that physicians' practices not fall be-
low the norm in their communities.175 Less than ideal treatment,
169. See notes 38-54 & accompanying text supra.
170. See I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 5.03 (doctors frequently
place loyalty to colleagues above.honesty to patient, refusing to tell patient that he or
she has suffered malpractice at the hands of another physician).
17 I. It might be argued that an attitude of skeptical alertness on the part of team
members could inhibit their teamwork or that the quality of medical care might be
lowered if subordinate members of the treatment team paid more attention to possible
mistakes on the part of the primary physician than they paid to the needs of the
patient.
172. See S. REID, CRIME & CRIMINOLOGY 306-14 (1976) (stress of police officers'
work results in group solidarity).
173. See Packer, Policing the Police, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 4, 1965, at 17 (great
public interest in controlling police misconduct). See also. P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE
POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW YORK CITY (1969); J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE
BEHAVIOR (1968).
1 174. See E. FREIDSON, DOCTORING TOGETHER 131 (1975) (describing physicians'
consciousness of fallibility: "[Tlhere but for the grace of God go I); I D. LOUISELL &
H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 2.26 (honest physicians recognize their own limitations
and take steps to minimize the impact of those limitations on patients); id.
2.03 (above-average practitioner possesses professional humility); W. NOLEN, supra
note 1, at 144-45, 147, 151-53, 165.
175. See I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 8.03 (malpractice stan-
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medical judgment that in retrospect could have been better, the
patient who unexpectedly dies-none of these is necessarily ac-
tionable. Only where the physician's error constituted clear mal-
practice would observing colleagues have a duty to report.
C. Effectiveness of a Duty to Disclose
1. Efficacy of the Duty
It might be argued that the proposed duty to disclose mal-
practice would not be effective. In order for the imposition of
such a duty to deter malpractice, some nondisclosure actions must
be brought, and, in order for such actions to be brought, malprac-
tice victims must have some way of learning that they have a
cause of action for nondisclosure. The objection could therefore
be raised that a patient could not sue for nondisclosure of mal-
practice until he or she knew that malpractice had occurred, and
the patient could not learn of the malpractice if the medical team
kept quiet about it.
Some patients will learn of the malpractice by chance;'
76
those who do will benefit from the new cause of action. 177 And,
other interests, including the symbolic message conveyed by
adopting the cause of action, support the imposition of a duty to
disclose. 78 But, if doctors frown on those who criticize colleagues
in public, resist service as expert witnesses in malpractice cases,
and tolerate physicians whose abilities are markedly substandard
or impaired, how can it be expected that they will conform to a
duty to disclose? First, many physicians are idealistic,' 79 law-
abiding citizens for whom a legal duty to disclose malpractice
would make a difference. Even if this were not true of every
member of the treatment team, the patient would be adequately
protected if only one member were to come forward. Recent de-
velopments in informed consent and in the duty to warn have im-
posed legal obligations on physicians that run counter to their
dard is failure to exercise reasonable skill or care); id. 8.05-.06 (emergence of objec-
tive standards of care); id 8.06 (demise of locality rule and trend toward uniform
national standards).
176. See text accompanying notes 17-18, 23 supra.
177. So long as there is no affirmative duty to disclose, a malpracticing physician
motivated only by self-interest will probably not disclose. Without the fear of addi-
tional liability for failure to disclose, such a physician will simply remain silent and
hope that his or her malpractice is not discovered. Under current law, the most that
the physician can lose by this course of action is the amount of damages he or she
would have lost had the malpractice come to light immediately. And, by nondisclo-
sure, the physician retains the use of this money until the malpractice is discovered.
178. See notes 186-88 & accompanying text infra.
179. See 1 D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 2.02 (many physicians
attracted to the practice of medicine for humanistic reasons).
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professional practices and instincts. 180 A growing number of ex-
ceptions to the doctor-patient and therapist-patient privileges' 81
have also required that physicians conform to new and unfamiliar
professional practices.182 Yet, after a period of initial grumbling
and opposition, the medical community has accepted each of
these legal innovations. '83 It seems likely that this will also occur
in the case of a judicially imposed duty to disclose malpractice.
Thus, as the duty becomes accepted, physicians desiring to
resist professional pressures and disclose malpractice to the pa-
tient will be able to point to legal authority to support their deci-
sions to disclose. Also as mentioned earlier, the recognition of a
legal duty to disclose would make possible, in a way a moral duty
would not, the development of remedies for retaliation against
those who come forward.1 84 This in turn would encourage greater
reporting.
180. The duty to obtain informed consent runs counter to physicians' notions of
professionalism and to their "right" to practice medicine as they see fit. The duty to
warn conflicts with psychotherapists' policies against disclosing confidential material
imparted by patients.
181. See, e.g., Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim.- The Therapist's
Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1025, 1033-35 (1974) (limitations placed on psychothera-
pist privilege); Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6
WAYNE L. REV. 175, 176, 181-83 (1960) (recently adopted rules narrowing scope of
medical privilege).
182. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014, Legislative Comment (West 1975) (psy-
choanalysis and psychotherapy depend on the "fullest revelation of the most intimate
and embarrassing details of the patient's life"; without protection of these confi-
dences, psychiatrists and psychotherapists will be unable to treat patients success-
fully); Fleming & Maximov, supra note 181, at 1031-33 (therapists feel sense of
obligation to protect patients' confidences).
183. The doctrine of informed consent has been widely adopted by American ju-
risdictions, 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 22.01, .03, .08, and has
been accepted as a fact of life by most medical practitioners. Indeed, there are indica-
tions that physicians and hospitals overprotect themselves against informed consent
suits with elaborate consent forms. Interview with William Winslade, Director, Pro-
gram in Medicine, Law and Human Values, UCLA, in Westwood, Cal. (Mar. 17,
1980).
Although there has been no formal study of compliance with the Tarasoffduty to
warn, knowledgeable observers believe that psychotherapists are complying with the
duty. 1d See also Comment, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychothera-
pists to Determine the Effect of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165, 185 (1-978).
Doctors and therapists also seem to be complying with subpoenas and discovery
orders made pursuant to an exception to medical or therapeutic privilege. But see In
re Lifshutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 420, 426-27, 467 P.2d 557, 559, 563-64, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829,
831, 835-36 (1970) (psychiatrist held in contempt for refusal to obey discovery orders).
See also I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 1.05 (medical profession
beginning to support concept of medical defense panels whose purpose is to procure
information concerning potential malpractice claims and decide which are meritori-
ous); id $ 6.02-.03 (efforts of medical community to abolish inferior techniques and
eliminate incompetent colleagues).
184. See note 53 supra (need to protect informants against retaliation); note 149
supra (methods of protection).
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Finally, some observing physicians may refrain from ap-
proaching the patient for fear that the primary physician may
have been on the verge of doing so and that his or her own hasty
disclosure will appear unseemly. The observing physician may
personally dislike the individual responsible for the malpractice,
or perceive him or her as a competitor. The physician may, there-
fore, hesitate to make a report for fear of seeming self-serving and
vindictive. A duty to disclose, running to all members of the treat-
ment team who observe the malpractice, avoids these problems.
A partial privilege will protect the person who makes disclosure in
good faith. 85 The disclosing physician need not worry about the
timing of his or her report or about "upstaging" the primary phy-
sician; unless they are assured that the patient has, in fact, been
notified, all members of the treatment team have a duty to report
the malpractice promptly.
Even if the duty to disclose is not universally obeyed-what
legal norm is?-reasons remain for its adoption. First, it has sym-
bolic value.' 86 Just as development of the informed consent doc-
trine communicated an important message about patients'
autonomy and their rights to participate in decisions concerning
treatment, 8 7 a requirement of disclosure would constitute a sig-
nificant expression of concern for the post-treatment well-being of
patients and their entitlement to information about procedures
performed on their bodies. 188 In addition, there is the matter of
185. See note 149 supra:
186. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ("Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill,
it teaches the whole people by its example."), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
Characterization of the tort of nondisclosure as intentional or negligent will af-
fect the way in which courts view the symbolic dimension of nondisclosure. In the
absence of tangible physical or economic harm, a patient might recover for the affront
of not being told that he or she had suffered malpractice, but only if nondisclosure is
characterized as a tort of intent. Nominal damages for infringement of dignity are
recoverable most readily when the action sounds in intentional tort. See D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.3, at 528-29 (1973); W. PROSSER, supra
note 27, § 8, at 30 & n.21, § 9, at 35-37, § 10.
187. See Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body .... "), overruled on other grounds, Bing v.
Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 665-67, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8-9, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 10-12 (1957); J.
KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 540-68 (1972) (autonomy interest is
primary rationale for doctrine of informed consent). See also note 96 supra.
188. In addition to their interests in compensation and in remedial medical mea-
sures, patients have an interest in simply knowing what has happened to them during
treatment. Imagine, for example, a case in which the remorse-stricken doctor, aware
of his or her wrongdoing, arranges to transfer funds to the patient's bank account,
anonymously, and with no explanation other than an unsigned letter stating that the
deposit is intended to settle an old score. The physician has ascertained that this
amount is an appropriate settlement by consulting court records in similar cases. At
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compensation. Where obvious malpractice occurs, yet no member
of the treatment team reports it to the patient, the patient may
suffer grave physical or economic harm. 89 If, as a result of a
chance event the patient discovers the malpractice years later, re-
covery against the primary physician may prove impossible be-
cause of his or her retirement, death, or departure from the
jurisdiction. Even if redress against the malpracticing physician is
possible, delay in bringing the action may have compounded the
harm to the patient or to his or her family. °90 Breach of a duty to
disclose makes the increased harms compensable' 9' and gives the
injured victim a larger number of potential defendants and causes
of action. 92 Thus, symbolic and practical reasons militate in
the same time the physician resolves never again to commit a similar error. Although
deterrence and compensation interests have been satisfied, does the patient have an
interest in requiring the doctor to disclose what happened during surgery? The pa-
tient's interest could be seen as part of the expanding notion of a "right to know,"
articulated by commentators and recognized by a few courts. See, e.g., Emerson, Le-
gal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1. Or, the patient's interest
could be seen as a reciprocal right to the right of privacy: the right to know intimate
information about oneself that one's right of privacy protects from the prying eyes of
others. Cf. R. BURT, supra note 57, at 117-19. The patient's right could also be
viewed as a corollary of the physician's duty to obtain informed consent. Thus, pa-
tients would be entitled to receive information about what had been done to them,
just as they are now entitled to know what may happen to them in the future. Finally,
the patient's right could be seen as an aspect of protection for the concept of per-
sonhood. A sense of personhood, according to some writers, is dependent upon con-
tinuity of experience and consciousness of self. See, e.g., Comment, The Limits of
State Intervention.- Personal Identity and Ultra-Risky Actions, 85 YALE L.J. 826
(1976).
189. See text accompanying notes 62-67, 150-54 supra.
190. See notes 62-67, 150-54 & accompanying text supra.
191. A small number of cases have held that economic harms can be compensated,
as consequential damages, in an action brought against the primary physician for the
original malpractice. See cases cited in notes 92-93 supra. These cases require, how-
ever, that the primary physician be available as a defendant when the malpractice
comes to light.
192. The adoption of a duty to disclose would alter the types and measures of
damages available to malpractice victims as follows:
A. DAMAGES AVAILABLE FOR UNDISCLOSED MALPRACTICE
BEFORE ADOPTION OF PROPOSED DUTY.
(1) From the ma/practicingphysician. The plaintiff can recover for the orig-
inal malpractice. If there are additional damages resulting from the delay, the plain-
tiff can recover for those that are physical and are directly attributable to the original
malpractice. Economic damages are probably not recoverable.
(2) From members of the treatment team who observed the ma/practice and
kept silent. The plaintiff can recover nothing.
B. DAMAGES AVAILABLE FOR UNDISCLOSED MALPRACTICE AF-
TER ADOPTION OF PROPOSED DUTY.
(1) From the ma/practicingphysician. The plaintiff can recover for the orig-
inal malpractice, as well as for any harm, physical or economic, resulting from the
nondisclosure.
(2) From members of the treatment team who observed the ma/practice and
UCLA LAW REVIEW
favor of recognition of the proposed duty, even if it is only par-
tially effective in reforming conduct.
2. Counterefficacy of the Duty
It could also be argued that a duty to disclose would be
counterproductive-that it might alter physicians' conduct in un-
desirable ways. Because of concern over the possibility that a
subordinate might report directly to the patient in the event of
malpractice, physicians might seek out subordinates for their mal-
leability rather than on the basis of their competence. As a result,
the quality of medical services patients receive might deteriorate.
A number of factors suggest that this result would be un-
likely. First, at many hospitals the physician has little choice with
respect to the composition of the treatment team; it is supplied by
kept silent. The plaintiff can recover for any damages, economic or physical, resulting
from nondisclosure, including loss of the original claim.
Another issue that must be considered in connection with damages for nondisclo-
sure is indemnification and contribution. See W. PROSSER, supra note 27, §§ 50-51.
A team member who is sued for nondisclosure might file a claim against the malprac-
ticing physician for indemnification on the theory that the malpracticing physician's
misconduct had rendered the team member liable. Or, the team member might file a
claim for contribution, on the theory that team members should apportion the dam-
ages according to their share of responsibility for the nondisclosure. The team mem-
ber's claim against the malpracticing physician would not accrue until he or she was
sued by the patient; hence, if brought promptly, it would generally not be barred by
any statute of limitations that might bar a suit by the patient against the surgeon. See
id § 50, at 309; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 76, at
377 (3d ed. 1976).
"Joint action" is required to bring the doctrine of contribution into play. This
requirement has been deemed satisfied when persons act in pursuit of a "common
plan or design." W. PROSSER, supra note 27, § 46, at 292. Joint action may consist of
active participation, cooperation, encouragement, aid lent to the tortfeasor, or ratifica-
tion or adoption of the tortfeasor's acts. Id. Express agreement is unnecessary; a tacit
understanding to proceed toward a common objective-such as concealment of mal-
practice-will suffice. Id
Indemnity has been permitted where one tortfeasor, through his or her active
conduct, creates a danger to a plaintiff, and the other tortfeasor merely fails to dis-
cover or remedy the danger. Id § 51, at 312. Indemnity generally has been permitted
where there is a "great difference" in the fault of the tortfeasor. Id. at 313.
Cases stemming from nondisclosure of malpractice would seem to meet the re-
quirements for contribution, but not for indemnification. Moreover, policy considera-
tions support allowing contribution, but not indemnification, in such cases. For
example, permitting team members to recover against the malpracticing physician
through indemnification decreases the pressure on the team member to come forward,
since all liability is passed to the malpracticing physician. On the other hand, the
malpracticing physician is more culpable than the team member in that he or she
committed the original malpractice and then failed to disclose; the team member
merely failed to disclose. Also, the malpracticing physician will probably be the
deeper pocket of the two defendants. Thus, in most cases, contribution should be
permitted but indemnity denied.
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the hospital. 193 The hospital would, of course, be anxious to avoid
liability for negligent supervision, 194 and hence would be strongly
motivated to hire competent personnel. It seems unlikely, as well,
that a physician who practices in a small office or clinic would
prefer to run the risk of multiple suits arising from the hiring of
incompetent assistants in order to gain occasional protection in a
suit resulting from his or her own malpractice. Because of the
great risk inherent in hiring incompetent but loyal associates and
the uncertainty of the gain, few physicians would be tempted to
avoid the responsibility to disclose malpractice in this fashion.
It might also be argued that, aside from the impact that a
duty to disclose would have on physicians, it is better for patients
not to know that they have been the victims of malpractice. Pa-
tients need to know that they have suffered malpractice, however,
in order to seek further treatment or to sue for relief. Moreover, a
patient may experience a severe shock if he or she learns of the
malpractice accidentally. 95 Thus, the "ignorance is bliss" argu-
ment supports, if any, only a very limited "therapeutic privilege"
exception to the duty to disclose.
196
D. Encouragement of False Reporting
It could be argued that a duty to disclose might be used vin-
dictively by certain physicians to punish mavericks, nonconform-
ists, or physicians who have spoken out against the medical
establishment. It could also serve as a weapon to eliminate indi-
vidual physicians' rivals. It might be asserted that, if the inform-
ant can argue that he or she is merely complying with a legal duty,
there will be a great temptation to use the duty to achieve im-
proper ends. A person who files a report in bad faith commits
defamation. 197 That the informant would be protected by a con-
ditional privilege 98 only if the report is made in good faith should
deter the filing of malicious reports. Moreover, professional disap-
proval of in-group criticism provides additional protection against
193. Interview with William Winslade, Director, Program in Law, Medicine, and
Human Values, UCLA, in Westwood, Cal. (Mar. 18, 1980).
194. See notes 118-23 & accompanying text supra (hospital has duty to supervise
personnel).
195. See, e.g., notes 13-18 & accompanying text supra (patient suffered serious
mental breakdown when she learned of malpractice through newspaper account, 18
months after it occurred).
196. See notes 162-65 & accompanying text supra.
197. Defamation is the dissemination of matter that is false and injurious to the
reputation of the person defamed. See 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2,
$ 18.13 (discussing damages in action for defamation); W. PROSSER, supra note 27,
§ 11l, at 737-44.
198. See discussion of conditional privilege in note 149 supra.
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abuse of the duty to report. 99
E. Effect on Medical Fees
One reason to impose a duty to disclose on the members of
the treatment team and the primary physician is that this will
spread the cost of malpractice more equitably than it is spread at
present. 200 Currently, patients as a group are able to recover for
only some, not all, cases of clearcut malpractice. Cases that do not
come to the attention of the victim or his or her survivors will
remain uncompensated forever. The victim must absorb the
losses, while the physician escapes liability altogether. 20' As a so-
ciety, we have already decided that malpractice is compensable,
and that patients who suffer from seriously deficient medical care
are entitled to recover from the doctor. Every malpractice action
increases the cost of practicing medicine and thereby contributes
directly or indirectly to higher medical fees. High fees are a se-
vere problem, but the solution should not be to deny the victim of
malpractice adequate compensation. Rather, ways must be found
to eliminate incompetent doctors who are responsible for a large
proportion of malpractice cases.20 2
F. Effect on Specialization
Higher malpractice premiums do not appear to prevent phy-
sicians from specializing, 20 3 probably because the monetary re-
wards for most forms of specialized practice are still extremely
attractive. And, if a small number of physicians is in fact deterred
from entering specialties by the prospect of a duty to disclose and
the resulting increase in the rate of discovery of medical malprac-
tice, this result is perhaps desirable. Recent studies of the distri-
199. See notes 48-51 & accompanying text supra.
200. See W. PROSSER, supra note 27, § 5, at 22 (desire to spread loss is a reason to
regard certain acts as torts).
201. See I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 1.07.
202. See Dornette, Role of the Healing Arts Licensing Board in the Current Medical
Malpractice Crisis, J. LEGAL MED., Mar. 1976, at 9 (inept practitioners responsible for
large part of malpractice crisis); id at 11-12 (possible responses to problem of the
"impaired" physician); Miike, Public Policy Directions in Medical Malpractice, J. LE-
GAL MED., Apr. 1976, at 9 ("There may be so many incompetent physicians that one's
life is in danger every time one sees a physician or enters a hospital.").
Adoption of the prcposed duty might well encourage hospitals to take action on
this problem. If hospital workers disclose instances of malpractice which they ob-
serve, the hospital will face an increased number of suits; together with the negative
publicity such suits generate. If the hospital employees do not disclose, they may be
sued for nondisclosure. In either case, the hospital will have an incentive to discharge
or to deny visiting privileges to physicians who are likely to cause such suits.
203. See, e.g., Curran, Law-Medicine Notes, Malpractice Claims: New Data and
New Trends, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 26, 27 (1979); Presser, Factors Affecting the Geo-
graphic Distribution ofPhysicians, J. LEGAL MED., Jan. 1975, at 12.
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bution of medical services reveal that most specialties are
oversubscribed 2°4 and that more primary care physicians in gen-
eral practice are needed.
20 5
G. Should a Duty to Disclose be Left to the Legislature?
Some might argue that it is preferable for the legislature,
rather than the courts, to consider the various interests at stake
and decide whether or not to impose a duty of disclosure. This
would, of course, be desirable. 2°6 The problem is that the medical
profession is far better organized and far better able to influence
the outcome of legislative struggles than are its patients.20 7 As a
result, legislation that provided for mandatory disclosure of mal-
practice would be highly unlikely to pass.20 8 Further, the pro-
204. See sources cited in note 203 supra; W. NOLEN, supra note 1, at 209 (most
specialists located in big-city teaching hospitals).
205. See, e.g., I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 2.05; Colwill, Pri-
mary Care Education in Multiple Specialties, 299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 657 (1978);
Perkoff, General Internal Medicine, Family Practice or Something Better, 299 id at
654; Relman, Who Will Train All Those Primary-Care Physicians?, 299 id at 652;
Scheffier, Weisfield, Ruby & Estes, A Manpower Policyfor Primary Health Care, 298
id at 1058 (1977); Thier & Berliner, Manpower Policy. Base it on Facts, Not Opinions,
299 id at 1305.
206. More desirable still, of course, would be for the legislature to find more
sweeping solutions to the malpractice crisis, such as national health insurance or a
national health service. Therefore, another objection to the proposed duty is that,
while it might offer symbolic value and aid patients in particular cases, the duty's
promulgation might slow the movement toward fundamental change in the structure
of medical care. In opting for the short-term partial measure, long-term and more
complete remedies might be postponed or foreclosed. The objection thus balances the
gains for today's patients that would result from adopting the duty against possibly
greater gains for tomorrow's patients if the duty is not adopted and more sweeping
reforms are instituted instead.
First, it is highly uncertain that a duty to disclose malpractice will slow the search
for more fundamental reforms. Rather, knowledge of the true extent of malpractice is
likely to increase the pressure for reform. Also, the forces opposing the restructuring
of medical services are powerful, and fundamental reforms may never be effected.
Sacrificing a duty of disclosure in order to hasten reforms that may never materialize
trades a tangible benefit for one that is merely speculative. Even if the duty does
delay other measures, this may be outweighed by the benefit the duty confers on
patients whose injuries otherwise would have gone uncompensated. Short-term gains
may thus outweigh long-term losses. For now, medical malpractice actions are the
lone avenue by which a victim of improper medical treatment may obtain relief.
Therefore, it seems advisable not to wait for uncertain future reforms, but to extend
and improve the approaches now available to patients so as to afford the most effec-
tive, fair form of relief possible.
207. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 143 (1962); R. KUNNES,
YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE 59-60 (1971); Montange, Consumer Protection and Pro-
fessional Services, J. LEGAL MED., May 1976, at 23. See also Malpractice. RX/or a
Crisis, TiME, June 16, 1975, at 49-50 (legislative responses to "malpractice crisis"
were aimed at protecting physicians from malpractice actions).
208. Could it be argued that the legislature has already "occupied the field" by
their attempts to address aspects of the malpractice problem? It might be asserted
that the legislature carefully considered the entire question of malpractice before
19801
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posed duty is a logical extension of judicial tort doctrine created
over decades of experience with medical malpractice cases.209
Thus, since social and political reasons exist for judicial activism
in this area, and the proposed duty is based on judicially created
tort doctrines, courts would not be preempting a primarily legisla-
tive function by creating a duty to disclose malpractice.
CONCLUSION
Innovations in tort theory have provided much needed aid to
plaintiffs faced with the "wall of silence" in medical malpractice
cases. Unfortunately, the benefits they provide inure only to indi-
viduals who realize they have been the victims of medical mal-
practice. Other victims, equally deserving of recompense, fail to
demand it because they have no reason to suspect that they have
suffered from deficient medical care. If the primary physician and
other members of the treatment team conceal malpractice, the vic-
tim may believe that his or her pain, debilitation, or loss of func-
tion are merely unfortunate results of the operation or procedure.
A duty to disclose malpractice is necessary because the medical
profession does not regulate itself effectively, discourages the re-
porting of malpractice to patients, and erects formal and informal
barriers to patients' access to information. The proposed duty to
disclose malpractice is consistent with current trends in tort law,
such as the development of the doctrines of informed consent, col-
lective responsibility, duty to warn, and duty to supervise. It
would remedy a serious imbalance in the physician-patient rela-
tionship, as well as enable some victims of malpractice to obtain
relief who would otherwise be unable to do so. It would give tan-
gible expression to the moral imperative that professionals who
injure their clients must inform them of the injury. It is a remedy
to which courts and legislatures should give serious attention.
drafting a statute which, since it does not contain a duty to disclose, stands as a legis-
lative statement that such a duty should not be imposed.
This line of reasoning is flawed, however. First, no legislature has given medical
malpractice the extensive treatment that might conceivably give rise to a presumption
that its silence on the question of a duty to disclose was deliberate. A review of legis-
lative enactments contained in D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMS, note 2 supra, suggests
that statutory treatment in this area tesids to be piecemeal, with reforms and amend-
ments coming at irregular intervals in response to specific needs. Many states leave
development of malpractice doctrine largely to the courts. See I D. LOUISELL &
H. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, 13.01-.64 (statute of limitations doctrine).
Moreover, even extensive statutory treatment of medical malpractice would not
necessarily imply that a legislature thought about a duty of disclosure and rejected it.
It would be equally likely that the legislators did not think about such a duty at all.
209. See notes 68-141 & accompanying text supra (developments in tort law sug-
gest that a duty of disclosure is feasible). The closest analogue to the duty to disclose
is informed consent; indeed, the proposed duty could be seen as an extension of the
judicially created doctrine of informed consent.
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